



# NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

## THESIS

**RESCUING TOMORROW TODAY: FIXING TRAINING  
AND DEVELOPMENT FOR DHS LEADERS**

by

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September 2016

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<b>REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE</b>			<i>Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188</i>	
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington, DC 20503.				
<b>1. AGENCY USE ONLY</b> (Leave blank)		<b>2. REPORT DATE</b> September 2016		<b>3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED</b> Master's thesis
<b>4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE</b> RESCUING TOMORROW TODAY: FIXING TRAINING AND DEVELOPMENT FOR DHS LEADERS			<b>5. FUNDING NUMBERS</b>	
<b>6. AUTHOR(S)</b> Jeffrey M. Miller				
<b>7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)</b> Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943-5000			<b>8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER</b>	
<b>9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)</b> N/A			<b>10. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER</b>	
<b>11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES</b> The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. IRB protocol number ____N/A____.				
<b>12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT</b> Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.			<b>12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE</b>	
<b>13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)</b>  Leadership is an essential quality that all homeland security professionals should possess. Unfortunately, the nature, scope, importance, and complexity of protecting the United States has overshadowed the fact that Department of Homeland Security (DHS) employees are not receiving the proper leadership training. Furthermore, lack of adequate training tools within the department is making it increasingly difficult to deliver the limited amount of available leadership training education. Personnel surveys reveal that the quality of leadership within the department is not getting better, and in some cases, it is perceived as worsening. As the first generation of homeland security leaders and managers depart the organization, DHS has a responsibility to its future generation of employees to identify leadership training and education deficiencies and provide individuals with the proper leadership tools for individual and departmental success. This thesis proposes that senior DHS leaders admit to the leadership training deficiencies, create programs to fill leadership training gaps in an integrated manner throughout the organization, develop accountability measures, and utilize portions of effective training and development programs from Department of Defense and civilian corporations alike.				
<b>14. SUBJECT TERMS</b> homeland security, Department of Defense, leadership, management, training, personnel development, mentorship, e-learning, blended learning solutions, Hurricane Katrina			<b>15. NUMBER OF PAGES</b> 91	
			<b>16. PRICE CODE</b>	
<b>17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT</b> Unclassified	<b>18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE</b> Unclassified	<b>19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT</b> Unclassified	<b>20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT</b> UU	

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**RESCUING TOMORROW TODAY: FIXING TRAINING AND DEVELOPMENT  
FOR DHS LEADERS**

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the  
requirements for the degree of

**MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES  
(HOMELAND SECURITY AND DEFENSE)**

from the

**NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL  
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## **ABSTRACT**

Leadership is an essential quality that all homeland security professionals should possess. Unfortunately, the nature, scope, importance, and complexity of protecting the United States has overshadowed the fact that Department of Homeland Security (DHS) employees are not receiving the proper leadership training. Furthermore, lack of adequate training tools within the department is making it increasingly difficult to deliver the limited amount of available leadership training education. Personnel surveys reveal that the quality of leadership within the department is not getting better, and in some cases, it is perceived as worsening. As the first generation of homeland security leaders and managers depart the organization, DHS has a responsibility to its future generation of employees to identify leadership training and education deficiencies and provide individuals with the proper leadership tools for individual and departmental success. This thesis proposes that senior DHS leaders admit to the leadership training deficiencies, create programs to fill leadership training gaps in an integrated manner throughout the organization, develop accountability measures, and utilize portions of effective training and development programs from Department of Defense and civilian corporations alike.

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## **LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS**

CDT	command delivered training
CNO	chief of naval operations
CBP	Customs and Border Protection
CNL	Center for Naval Leadership
CPPD	Center for Personal and Professional Development
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
DOD	Department of Defense
DOJ	Department of Justice
DOT	Department of Transportation
EMAC	emergency management assistance compact
EO	executive order
EQCs	executive core qualifications
ESC	executive steering committee
ESF	emergency support function
FAA	Federal Aviation Administration
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
FLETC	Federal Law Enforcement Training Center
GAO	Government Accountability Office
HPC	Human Performance Center
HSPD	homeland security presidential directive
LDP	Leadership Development Program
MIT	Massachusetts Institute of Technology
MRE	meals ready to eat
NIMS	National Incident Management System
NLCM	naval leadership competency model
NSC	National Security Council
NSP	national security professionals
NSPD	national security professional development
NSPD-IO	National Security Professional Development Integration Office
OCS	Officer Candidate School

OPM	Office of Personnel Management
ROTC	Reserve Officer Training Command
SERE	survival evasion resistance and escape
SES	Senior Executive Service
TSA	Transportation Security Administration
USCG	U.S. Coast Guard

## **ACKNOWLEDGMENTS**

I want to thank my family for their unwavering support during the last 15 years of my military career. In addition, thank you to my fiancé, who helped me transition from the fleet back to the academic environment. It is unlikely that I would have succeeded without her support. I cannot wait for us to succeed together in life as husband and wife.

A special thanks to Dr. Halladay, who took all my thoughts and opinions on what I believe is a leadership crisis within the Department of Defense and translated those ideas into something that can be useful to the Department of Homeland Security.

I want to thank all the great mentors and leaders I have had in my naval career, including: Commander Bill Conway, Lieutenant Commander Michael Therrien, Lieutenant Commander Paul Nickell, Lieutenant Commander Ian Lake, and Master Chief Joe Bridges. Without these individuals, I would not be the person or naval officer that I am today.

Lastly, I would like to acknowledge those who told me I could not become a naval officer, and those who said I would not be a naval aviator. Thank you for the motivation.

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## I. DHS LEADERSHIP UNDER THE MICROSCOPE

In light of recent events—including the flawed Deepwater Horizon oil spill emergency response, 72 employees appearing on terrorist watch lists, and a 95 percent failure rate for Transportation Security Administration (TSA) security screenings—the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has been scrutinized for its leadership, or more appropriately for the lack thereof.<sup>1</sup> According to a 2015 federal employee survey, DHS ranks dead last among large agencies when it comes to morale.<sup>2</sup> DHS has attempted to boost morale through several internal efforts, but morale decline continues.<sup>3</sup> There is a strong case to be made that leadership stands at the center of this failure; however, leadership also could be the way out of the problem. Many organizations around the world, large and small, have dealt with leadership failures, and those that have given proper attention to leadership training and techniques have proven there is future success to be had.

This thesis sets out to use elements of the Department of Defense (DOD), specifically the Department of the Navy, as a model by which DHS can improve its current leadership programs and possibly develop new ones. It is not my intent to prove that DHS is inferior when it comes to all aspects of leadership training, techniques, and management, but rather to show that long-established organizations can provide valuable insight into leadership successes and failures, which may result in positive changes within DHS. In the end, I found that although the Navy has not produced optimum methodologies for institutional leadership training, its ability to distribute and track leadership training through classrooms, online, and blended learning methods is far superior to that of DHS.

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<sup>1</sup> Adam Credo, “72 DHS Employees on Terrorist Watch List,” *Washington Free Beacon*, December 6, 2015, <http://freebeacon.com/national-security/72-dhs-employees-on-terrorist-watch-list/>.

<sup>2</sup> Jerry Markon, “Homeland Security Ranks Last in Morale—Again—but Jeh Johnson’s Morale Is High,” *Washington Post*, September 29, 2015, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/federal-eye/wp/2015/09/29/dhs-disappointed-by-latest-low-morale-scores-vows-to-keep-trying/>.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*

## **A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTIONS**

What can the Department of Homeland Security learn from the Department of Defense's leadership training programs and methodologies? This thesis explores several aspects of leadership training and development by examining past, present, and proposed methodologies by both the Navy and DHS. Leadership success cannot be achieved by utilizing one type of technique or methodology. However, empirical data and theory can help determine which leadership tenets remain at the forefront of successful organizations.

## **B. PROBLEM STATEMENT**


DHS is made up of more than 240,000 employees.<sup>4</sup> When DHS was created in 2001, 22 different federal departments and agencies were merged to create one of the largest government agencies ever.<sup>5</sup> The leaders and managers of these diverse agencies were given the task of bringing the agency together, literally and figuratively. The result so far is an uneasy blend of organizations and functions, which is evident in the department's organizational chart (see Figure 1).

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<sup>4</sup> About DHS," Department of Homeland Security, ""June 29, 2016, <https://www.dhs.gov/about-dhs>.

<sup>5</sup> "Who Joined DHS," Department of Homeland Security, ""September 15, 2015, <https://www.dhs.gov/who-joined-dhs>.

Figure 1. DHS Organizational Framework<sup>6</sup>



<sup>6</sup> “Department Organizational Chart,” Department of Homeland Security, accessed August 27, 2016, <https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Department%20Org%20Chart.pdf>.

DHS deals with various types of management programs, such as domestic incident management, counterterrorism management, crisis management, and emergency management. Some of these management programs are so large that they require their own federal organizations—such as the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) or the National Incident Management System (NIMS). A number of DHS’s agencies are tasked with dealing with some aspect of emergency management. As defined by the Post-Katrina Act of 2006, emergency management is:

the governmental function that coordinates and integrates all activities to build, sustain, and improve the capability to prepare for, protect against, respond to, recover from, or mitigate against threatened or actual natural disasters, acts of terrorism or man-made disasters.<sup>7</sup>

Among the emergency support functions within the Incident Command System, eight of the fifteen functions have the word *management* written into their description.<sup>8</sup>

Leadership and management are not the same thing, however. Paul Hersey defines leadership as “any attempt to influence the behavior of another individual or group,” and management as “working with and through others to accomplish organizational goals.”<sup>9</sup> Similarly, Taylor and Rosenbach describe leadership as “getting people to work together to make things happen that might not otherwise occur, or to prevent things from happening that would ordinarily take place.”<sup>10</sup> Understanding that leadership and management are two different skills an individual can possess is important. Moreover, being good at one does not necessarily mean being good at the other. Organizations desiring to teach their employees leadership and management skills must understand this distinction in order to create training programs that reflect the tenants of leadership and management individually, rather than attempting to teach both at the same time as if they were one and the same.

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<sup>7</sup> James D. Ramsay and Linda A. Kiltz, *Critical Issues in Homeland Security: A Casebook* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2013), Kindle edition, 297–298.

<sup>8</sup> John Fass Morton, *Next Generation Homeland Security: Network Federalism and the Course to National Preparedness* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2012), Kindle edition, 105–106.

<sup>9</sup> Paul Hersey, *The Situational Leader* (Escondido, CA: Center for Leadership Studies, 1984), 16.

<sup>10</sup> Lincoln Andrews, “Leadership,” in *Military Leadership: The Pursuit of Excellence*, ed. Robert Taylor, William E. Rosenbach, and Eric Rosenbach (Boulder, CO: West View Press, 2009), 1.

The first mission of DHS's five core missions is to prevent terrorism and enhance security. This mission entails three goals: preventing terrorist attacks; preventing the unauthorized acquisition, importation, movement, or use of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear materials and capabilities within the United States; and reducing the vulnerability of critical infrastructure and key resources, essential leadership, and major events to terrorist attacks and other hazards.<sup>11</sup> By the definition of Taylor and Rosenbach, it is clear that leadership plays a vital role in mission success.

### C. LITERATURE REVIEW

Although many books have been written about individual leaders themselves, few professionals agree on the exact formula for leadership. For instance, James MacGregor, a Pulitzer Prize winner wrote, "we know a lot about leaders, yet very little about leadership."<sup>12</sup> The U.S. armed forces form something of an exception to this rule, as much of their training, development, and thought concerns leadership. Still, there remains some question as to whether leaders are born or made and what impact institutional leadership training can have on individuals and organizations.

Adhering to the premise that leaders are made (i.e., leadership can be taught), many organizations create lists of the tenets of leadership they think are most important. For example, the Department of Defense publishes *The Armed Forces Officer*, which lists five leadership competencies, including bond of trust, setting and enforcing standards, setting the example, modeling courage, and building and sustaining morale.<sup>13</sup> As another example, the Senior Executive Service (SES) lists eight characteristics that leaders should possess in the Department of Homeland Security: principled, people-centered, effective communicator, performance-centered, diversity advocate, highly collaborative, nimble and innovative, and a steward of public resources.<sup>14</sup> More lists are contained in such

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<sup>11</sup> "Prevent Terrorism and Enhance Security," Department of Homeland Security, "May 6, 2016, <https://www.dhs.gov/prevent-terrorism-and-enhance-security>.

<sup>12</sup> Andrews, "Leadership," 1.

<sup>13</sup> Robert Wray Jr., *Saltwater Leadership: A Primer on Leadership for the Junior Officer* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2013), 32.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, 34.

publications as *The Fundamentals of Naval Leadership*, *The Division Officers Guide*, *Leadership Lessons of the White House Fellows*, *The Successful Executives Handbook*, *The AMA Handbook of Leadership*, and so on.

The problem with these lists is they do not explain how an individual is to acquire such traits if he or she does not already possess them. The debate over whether leadership can be learned or must be inherent is also found in the works of military writers. For instance, Milan Vego explains, “in general, leadership is the product of both heredity and personality.”<sup>15</sup> In contrast, Rear Admiral Robert O. Wray Jr. argues that leadership can be learned and states, “You don’t have to be born with it. Whatever you are today, you can become a leader, if you choose.”<sup>16</sup> Joseph L. Thomas, a distinguished professor of leadership at the U.S. Naval Academy comes down even more emphatically for nurture, rather than nature, as the stuff of good leaders, stating, “This theory of hereditary dominance has been rightly discarded by modern theorist, although echoes of it are still found in the work of contemporary theorist such as Harvard University’s Howard Gardner, countless biographical historians, and the military.”<sup>17</sup> According to Thomas, leadership theories that include hereditary dominance are outdated and have been “augmented by other paradigms.”<sup>18</sup>

However, experts on leadership note that some aspects do appear to be innate. Such character traits as courage, honor, character, pride, boldness, and creativity all come from a place within, strengthened by the institutional knowledge already acquired.<sup>19</sup> Vego states, “The principal requirement for a successful operational leader are high intellect, strong personality, courage, boldness, and the will to act, combined with the extensive professional knowledge and experience.”<sup>20</sup> Therefore, it is important that

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<sup>15</sup> Milan Vego, “Joint Operational Warfare,” in *Operational Leadership* (Newport: Naval War College, 2009), x-6.

<sup>16</sup> Wray, *Saltwater Leadership*, 4.

<sup>17</sup> Joseph Thomas, *Leader Development in the U.S. Department of Defense: A Brief Historical Review and Assessment for the Future* (Annapolis, MD: United States Naval Academy, 2009), [http://www.usna.edu/Ethics/\\_files/documents/Leader%20Development%20History%20Thomas.pdf](http://www.usna.edu/Ethics/_files/documents/Leader%20Development%20History%20Thomas.pdf), 3.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, 4.

<sup>19</sup> Vego, “Joint Operational Warfare,” x-13.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*

institutions identify non-hereditary characteristics of leadership they wish their employees to possess and train them to develop these traits over time.

A significant aspect of leadership is understanding relationships between leaders and the people who are being led. Many military publications acknowledge this concept. The Navy's Order 21 states that leadership is "the art of accomplishing the Navy's mission through people."<sup>21</sup> Similarly, the U.S. Army leadership field manual states, "Your job as a leader isn't to make everyone the same."<sup>22</sup> A leader "should try to understand individuals based on their own ideas, qualifications, and contributions and not jump to conclusions based on stereotypes."<sup>23</sup> A poor leader or organization will try and make everyone the same, treating people more like inventory rather than a valuable commodity.<sup>24</sup> As Brigadier General Lincoln C. Andrew states, "How absolutely important then that a leader know the personalities of his men."<sup>25</sup>

To be sure, leadership is not about popularity. Research shows that those who engaged in high-level tasks, such as mission planning and procedure development, but who were not engaged with their peers, are still considered leaders.<sup>26</sup> Those who engaged with their peers, but did not participate in high-level tasks, are not considered leaders.<sup>27</sup> In other words, particularly in a mission-focused organization, actual expertise matters and can, at least to some degree, carry along a leader who may not possess the finest people skills—which, after all, figure more prominently in management.<sup>28</sup>

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<sup>21</sup>Wray Jr., *Saltwater Leadership*, 5.

<sup>22</sup> Department of the Army, *Battle-Tested Wisdom for Leaders in an Organization* (FM 22–100) (New York: McGraw Hill, 2004), 36.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid.

<sup>24</sup> Austin Hulbert, *A Bad Time for Timing: An Analysis of the U.S. Navy Officer Promotion Process*, 2014, <http://www.scribd.com/doc/238224590/A-Bad-Time-for-Timing-An-Analysis-of-the-US-Navy-Officer-Promotion-Process>.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid

<sup>26</sup> Andrews, "Leadership," 2.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid.

<sup>28</sup> Committee on the Department of Homeland Security Workforce Resilience, Board on Health Sciences Policy, and Institute of Medicine, *Security Workforce Resilience, A Ready and Resilient Workforce for the Department of Homeland Security Protecting Americas Front Line* (Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2013), 93.

Ultimately, however, the relationship between the leader and the people he or she leads must be transformational. according to Taylor and Rosenbach.<sup>29</sup> Specifically, such a leader:

motivates followers to perform beyond expectations by creating an awareness of the importance of the mission and the vision in such a way that followers share beliefs and values and can transcend self-interest to tie the vision to self-esteem and self-actualization, both higher order needs.<sup>30</sup>

#### **D. HYPOTHESES AND ASSUMPTIONS**

In “Operational Leadership,” Milan Vego explains, “military leadership can be explained in three basic levels: strategic, operational, and tactical.”<sup>31</sup> Although DHS is a separate department from the DOD, it does share similar operational objectives. The operational leader, or commander as Vego defines the position, is responsible for completing the objectives assigned by his or her superior.<sup>32</sup> The commander has the responsibility for “making critical decisions based on ambiguous information.”<sup>33</sup> To accomplish tasks, leaders must rely on training, education, experience, and knowledge that have been taught to them by formal institutions designed for this purpose. In the DOD, individuals attend boot camp, Officer Candidate School (OCS), the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC), or the military academies. For DHS, individuals attend Border Patrol Academy for Customs and Border Protection (CBP) or the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) for Secret Service. It is apparent that both DHS and the DOD understand the importance of providing individuals with basic training prior to becoming part of their respective organizations. If leadership training is not integrated into these basic levels of training as well as throughout career milestones, individuals will lack the appropriate leadership tools and be forced to manage from behind rather than lead from the front.

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<sup>29</sup> Andrews, “Leadership,” 2.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid., 3.

<sup>31</sup> Vego, “Joint Operational Warfare,” x-5.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid.

On the one hand, DHS is not alone in the tendency to emphasize management over leadership. A naval officer survey conducted in 1988 collected data to determine how much time officers spent on management, technical skills, and leadership. The results were 42.31 percent on management, 28.78 percent technical, and 28.9 percent leadership.<sup>34</sup> These results show that naval officers spend the majority of their time managing rather than leading. Since we know the Navy values leadership as one of its most important skills, the logical conclusion is that the Navy, in 1988, was not tapping into its full leadership potential. During the next two decades, these results drove the Navy to develop more comprehensive institutional leadership development programs, which are discussed in the following chapters.

The DOD is constantly revising its leadership programs to reflect current organizational and operational goals. For example, former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara developed the systems analysis approach at Harvard and originally used it in the automotive industry.<sup>35</sup> The problem with his method was that it was based on process improvement rather than leadership development, so in the late 1960s, the Navy discarded it as a method for teaching leadership. Following the systems analysis approach was Total Quality Leadership, then Principle Centered Leadership in the 1990s, and Lean Six Sigma in the 2000s.<sup>36</sup> Many of these approaches enjoyed wide currency at the time in civilian industry. Indeed, DOD branches have borrowed effective methods from each other as well as from civilian organizations.

This thesis illustrates that lack of a formal, institutionalized leadership program is causing a major negative impact within DHS. By using the DOD and the Navy as positive examples of how quality leadership training can impact organizations, it should no longer be accepted that DHS has developed no formal leadership training program and

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<sup>34</sup> Raymond Lewis, "Naval Leadership: A Study of Views on Leadership Competencies and Methods to Reinforce Leadership Skills" (master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 1990), [http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/27622/90Dec\\_Lewis.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y](http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/27622/90Dec_Lewis.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y), 38.

<sup>35</sup> Thomas, *Leader Development in the U.S. Department of Defense*, 4.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, 5.

“focuses on large, high dollar programs and policies at the expense of organizational success.”<sup>37</sup>

## **E. RESEARCH DESIGN**

The subject of DHS leadership has been written about for many years. The purpose of this thesis is to motivate DHS to stop discussing and analyzing its leadership shortcomings and start making programs to correct its deficiencies. For too long DHS has relied on the excuses that the organization is too large and its component organizations too different to employ a comprehensive leadership program that is effective for every individual in every organization. Using the DOD as a model, DHS will see that large, complex organizations can have an effective leadership training program.

My research for this thesis mainly consists of current readings that allow for accurate comparisons between the DOD and DHS in the 21st century. Also, the research covers at least one reading from each DOD branch to ensure that the DOD methodologies on leadership are not bias toward one branch or another. I also attempt to show as many similarities as possible between the two organizations to support the idea that DHS can adapt many techniques from the DOD into its organizations because they both operate using a common mission framework.

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<sup>37</sup> *Testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations, and Management, 112th Cong., 1 (2012) (statement of Thad Allen).*

## **II. HURRICANE KATRINA: A LEADERSHIP CASE STUDY**

Natural disasters are an unfortunate, but focused, way for DHS to test its training, policies, and procedures. Each response requires leadership at the highest levels, as well as on-the-spot leadership from those who find themselves in the wrong place at the right time. None of these leaders has the luxury of having a bad day of leading in these situations—so one might hope that the known or foreseeable barriers to effective leadership would be cleared through time, training, practice, and policy. Unfortunately, this aspiration remains out of reach, particularly for DHS leaders.

Typically, Hurricane Katrina figures prominently in accounts of how DHS leadership has failed. In fact, Hurricane Katrina is an excellent case study to show that even if DHS was run brilliantly at all times, it would still not have a 100 percent success rate. In the following chapter, I show how internal and external barriers, including legalities, organizational structure, interagency coordination, congressional barriers, and the disasters themselves, provide challenges for all leaders within DHS. In later chapters, I discuss how institutional leadership training could have prevented many of the response, coordination, and procedural problems that are still present in DHS today.

### **A. DISASTER MANAGEMENT—HURRICANE KATRINA**

The greatest external factor that created barriers to leadership and management was Hurricane Katrina itself. Even though it was one of the most accurately predicted hurricanes in history, the damage of this 2005 hurricane was catastrophic. Estimates run as high as \$100 billion in property damage, 300,000 homes lost, 118 million cubic yards of debris, and 1,330 deaths.<sup>38</sup>

Hurricane Katrina was the first event to expose major weaknesses within DHS, which had been around for about two years at the time. Subsequently, several reports were compiled to investigate the shortcomings of DHS during its response effort. One of

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<sup>38</sup> White House, *The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned* (Washington, DC: White House, 2006), <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/whitehouse/katrina/katrina-lessons-learned.pdf>, 7–8.

these reports, by Frances Fragos Townsend, identifies 17 critical challenges with which DHS and other responders dealt with.<sup>39</sup> This section examines several of these challenges, placing an emphasis on national preparedness, communications, logistics and evacuations, training and exercises, legalities, and lessons learned. Furthermore, this summary of events analyzes the effects of poor management on an individual's ability to lead.

## **1. Preparedness—What's in a Name?**

One major impediment to effective leadership at DHS is the lack of clarity of one of its five key missions, preparedness. Preparedness was the second greatest external factor affecting DHS's leadership response. Preparedness, like leadership, is somewhat of an abstract term, depending on who is using it. DHS and FEMA have defined preparedness as:

a continuous cycle of planning, organizing, training, equipping, exercising, evaluating, and taking corrective action in an effort to ensure effective coordination during incident response. This cycle is one element of a broader National Preparedness System to prevent, respond to, and recover from natural disasters, acts of terrorism, and other disasters.<sup>40</sup>

DHS's ability to prepare is regulated by constitutional authority that allows individual states to handle disasters in a manner they see fit, until the point at which they can no longer handle the situation without federal support.<sup>41</sup> This structure, mandated under current legislation known as the Stafford Act, can affect leaders within DHS because their hands are tied until the state requests permission for help. Examples of this are not limited to Hurricane Katrina but also present in other environmental disasters, such as the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. A 2015 report from North Carolina State University states:

The Deepwater Horizon oil spill was accompanied by intergovernmental blame casting and criticisms similar to that of Hurricane Katrina. The

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<sup>39</sup> Ibid., 51.

<sup>40</sup> "Plan and Prepare," Department of Homeland Security, "last modified September 10, 2015, <https://www.dhs.gov/topic/plan-and-prepare-disasters>.

<sup>41</sup> White House, *The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina*, 11.

federal response was often viewed as slow, state officials were unsure of their role, and local officials complained that they were not adequately consulted.<sup>42</sup>

Failure of the National Incident Management System (NIMS) to provide coordination between federal and local authorities before, during, and after these events is a prime example of how a federalist system, structured by law, can create barriers rather than removing them.

As DHS continues to develop its leadership programs, it must include training on the chain of command. Specifically, DHS must emphasize the fact that chain of command is not only based on rank but also on situational authority. Hurricane Katrina response efforts were made more difficult by the fact that leaders did not define a clear chain of command throughout the interagency disaster management process. Although not every situation can be covered in a joint publication, individuals at various levels of responsibility should always know who is in charge when entities other than DHS are involved. DHS employees face ambiguity in day-to-day operations that must be overcome in a timely manner by leaders who have been trained to know their roll in various stages during the development of an operation.

## **2. Organizational Structure**

DHS either has too much or too little leadership, depending on how an observer perceives its structure. Either way, the organization itself represents a barrier to leadership. DHS was created in response to the attacks on September 11, 2001. On March 3, 2003, DHS merged 22 departments and nearly 200,000 people to create one of the biggest federal agencies in history.<sup>43</sup> The Office of Personnel Management states:

As of September 2013, Department of Veteran Affairs has 337,683 (16.3 percent) federal employees in pay status; Department of Army has 261,029 (12.6 percent) federal employees; Department of Navy has 194,301 (9.4 percent) federal employees; Department of Homeland

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<sup>42</sup> Thomas Birkland and Sarah DeYoung, "Emergency Response, Doctrinal Confusion, and Federalism in the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill," *Publius: The Journal of Federalism* 41, no. 3 (2011):471–493, [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/227465152\\_Emergency\\_Response\\_Doctrinal\\_Confusion\\_and\\_Federalism\\_in\\_the\\_Deepwater\\_Horizon\\_Oil\\_Spill](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/227465152_Emergency_Response_Doctrinal_Confusion_and_Federalism_in_the_Deepwater_Horizon_Oil_Spill).

<sup>43</sup> White House, *The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina*, 12.

Security has 193,867 (9.4 percent) federal employees; and Department of Air Force has 167,439 (8.1 percent) federal employees.<sup>44</sup>

Although these numbers were a bit different at the time of the disaster, one can see just how large DHS is.

DHS had several interagency coordination problems that could have been solved by cross-training prior to the storm. FEMA in particular was a victim of its inability to coordinate with various agencies. A performance review by the Office of Inspector General explains that coordination between FEMA and the Red Cross created more confusion because the organizations “experienced difficulty in identifying the number and location of evacuees because both held different expectations for coordinating the mass care function.”<sup>45</sup> FEMA also experienced difficulties with its role as Emergency Support Function (ESF)-9, urban search and rescue coordinator. Many of the rescue efforts provided by the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), DOD, National Guard, and emergency management assistance compacts (EMACs) were not coordinated by FEMA due to its inability to handle the number of assets available.<sup>46</sup> Also, the ESF-15 function, which provides coordination of information to all authorities during the event, suffered a near collapse as communication infrastructure failed, and personnel experienced confusion as to who was in charge of providing information to different levels of authority.<sup>47</sup> Incidents like these can be prevented in the future by establishing a leadership hierarchy in conjunction with *National Security Presidential Directive* (NSPD)-5.

### **3. National Security Presidential Directive-5**

Homeland security operations are directed by *Homeland Security Presidential Directive* (HSPD)-5. The HSPDs are modified by presidential directives, which contain

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<sup>44</sup> U.S. Office of Personnel Management, “Frequently Asked Questions: Workforce Information,” accessed August 26, 2016, <https://www.opm.gov/FAQs/QA.aspx?fid=56538f91-625a-4333-84ba-28b3574b7942&pid=013be2c9-8ae5-455d-889c-6e74063441ba>.

<sup>45</sup> Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General, *A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities in Response to Hurricane Katrina* (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2006), [https://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/OIG\\_06-32\\_Mar06.pdf](https://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/OIG_06-32_Mar06.pdf), 35.

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*, 55.

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*, 60.

policy, tasking, and technical/conforming amendments to HSPDs-1/2/3.<sup>48</sup> HSPD-5 directs federal authorities as to how they should interact with local governments. Of course, this document and its plans are extremely important to the mission of DHS, but it does create difficulties.

For example, local authorities train together every day and have their own policies and procedures regarding various response efforts. These methods may or may not be the same throughout the state. Even if they are, organizations will naturally do things a little bit differently than their counterparts. These differences create an opportunity for cross-training to take place, which is a valuable tool that DHS addressed in its employee training plan published in 2004.<sup>49</sup> However, cross-training requires funding, manpower, and time, and the state might not have an excess of any of these. When considering that HSPD-5 directs federal authorities to develop a game plan for how they will coordinate in the event of a disaster requiring federal assistance, one can see the scope of that task. *The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned* identified that interagency red tape caused many delays that hindered the effectiveness of response efforts. It states, “We must transform our approach for catastrophic incidents from one of bureaucratic coordination to proactive unified command that creates true unity effort.”<sup>50</sup>

## **B. CONGRESSIONAL BARRIERS**

In 2004, the 9/11 Commission expressed concern about too much congressional oversight presiding over our national security. At the time, the number of homeland security related committees and subcommittees numbered 86. The complexity of DHS oversight is illustrated in Figure 2.<sup>51</sup> In 2010, the deputy director of DHS was asked about congressional oversight, and she stated the agency reported to 108 committees and

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<sup>48</sup> Department of Homeland Security, *Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5* (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2015), <https://www.dhs.gov/publication/homeland-security-presidential-directive-5>.

<sup>49</sup> Department of Homeland Security Training Plan Steering Committee [Steering Committee], *DHS Employee Training Plan* (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2009), <https://www.dhs.state.or.us/training/publications/DHSTrainingPlan.pdf>, 30.

<sup>50</sup> White House, *The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina*, 70.

<sup>51</sup> “National Security: Who Oversees Homeland Security? Um, Who Doesn’t?,” *National Public Radio*, July 20, 2010, <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=128642876>.

subcommittees.<sup>52</sup> Peter King, the highest-ranking republican on the House Committee on Homeland Security, says about the oversight, “It just becomes a minefield and also a tremendous source of delay, time and confusion for the Department of Homeland Security.”<sup>53</sup> Furthermore, senior leaders within DHS find themselves reporting to committee after committee, each of which provides various direction for the department. The only problem is, as stated by Michael Chertoff, Secretary of DHS from 2005–2009, “the direction you get from the committees tends to be inconsistent.”<sup>54</sup>


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<sup>52</sup> Ibid.

<sup>53</sup> Ibid.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid.

Figure 2. DHS Oversight Complexity<sup>55</sup>



And there is a lot of direction to DHS. Due to politics, jurisdiction issues, and funding, all of the congressional oversight the several component organizations and functions brought to the merger that became DHS has persisted with little or no

<sup>55</sup> Source: Annenberg Public Policy Center, “Ten Years Ago, the 9/11 Commission Urged Congress to Simplify the Oversight of Homeland Security,” July 16, 2014, <http://www.annenbergpublicpolicycenter.org/security/>.

streamlining, deconflicting, or blending. Rather, everyone wants to keep control over their portions within the organizational structure that is overseen by the committees on homeland security.<sup>56</sup> As a result, DHS is constantly expending efforts increasing administrative processes when those efforts could be going to protecting the nation.

Political scientists speculate that political reasons for not wanting to give up committee oversight range from elevated campaign credentials to not wanting to be cut out of the “inner circle.”<sup>57</sup> As a comparison for DHS oversight, Senator Joseph Lieberman looked at the Department of Defense and how it runs its program. He said this of the Senate Armed Services Committee: “It oversees the entire Department of Defense, which has a budget, oh probably 15 times the size of the DHS budget. So this is doable.”<sup>58</sup>

On the other hand, research from Vanderbilt University on congressional oversight shows a different view. It found that,

increasing the number of committees with access to an agency may simultaneously increase the ability of members to secure electorally valuable private goods for their constituents but undermine the ability of Congress as an institution to respond collectively to the actions of the presidency or the bureaucracy.<sup>59</sup>

The report further concludes:

Members overly focused on securing district resources such as homeland security grants, visas for constituents, and disaster relief from the department may be unwilling or unable to focus on the larger policy goals. The ability and incentive of members of Congress to secure private goods for their district does not imply that a similar ability and incentive exists when dealing with the provision of public goods and the more diffuse policy goals.<sup>60</sup>

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<sup>56</sup> Annenberg Public Policy Center, “Ten Years Ago.”

<sup>57</sup> Ibid.

<sup>58</sup> Ibid.

<sup>59</sup> Joshua Clinton, David Lewis, and Jennifer Selin, “Influencing the Bureaucracy: The Irony of Congressional Oversight,” *American Journal of Political Science* (2013): 1–15, doi 10.1111/ajps. 12066.

<sup>60</sup> Ibid.

Simply put, many members of these DHS oversight committees are more interested in what they can procure for the benefit of their constituents rather than the overall functionality of DHS and the security of the nation.

The journal article “Crisis Bureaucracy” describes how congressional politics rewrote the president’s initial Homeland Security Act to “serve the interest of its members; that is to conform with the political-bureaucratic system.”<sup>61</sup> The act was re-constructed to create inconsistencies that allow the bureaucratic machine to keep churning, which in turn keeps the money flowing. The authors cite examples of how the Homeland Security Act was re-written to become a revolving door of government spending:

goal distortion and the distributive tendency; multiple veto points forcing alterations in the legislation; intra-congressional committee jurisdictional issues; electoral goals of the majority party against the minority party; uncertainty about the reorganization; and the role of the crisis.<sup>62</sup>

### **C. FUNDING: A \$30 BILLION BARRIER?**

While the influence of politicians over government programs is undeniable, there is quantitative evidence to dispute the claims that elected officials are placing grant funding over fighting terrorism. The assertion that DHS grant money is being spent too haphazardly comes from the fact that smaller states, with less probability of an attack, have received more per capita grant dollars than other, more densely populated states.<sup>63</sup> Therefore, the issue is not the grants but rather the allocation of them. Originally, states were paid grant money a base level of funding, and the rest was distributed in direct proportion to a state’s population.<sup>64</sup> This distribution was deemed inefficient because it did not incorporate risk-level analysis to fund distribution. As a result in 2006, the

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<sup>61</sup> Dara Kay Cohen, Marina-Florentino Cuellar, and Barry R. Weingast, “Crisis Bureaucracy: Homeland Security and the Political Design of Legal Mandates,” *Stanford Law Review* 59, no. 3 (2007): 715.

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>63</sup> Tyler Prante and Alok Bohara, “What Determines Homeland Security Spending? An Econometric Analysis of the Homeland Security Grant Program,” *Policy Studies Journal* 36, no. 2 (2008): 244, doi 10.1111/j. 1541-0072.2008.00264.x.

<sup>64</sup> *Ibid.*, 245.

Department of Homeland Security Appropriation changed the way funding was distributed by incorporating risk analysis into distribution.

A study reported in the *Policy Studies Journal* analyzed four grant programs: State Homeland Security Grant Program, Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program, Urban Areas Security Initiative, and the Citizens Corps Program.<sup>65</sup> The authors used mathematical formulas to determine if elected officials were concerned with external threats or special interest when it comes to procuring grant funding. The researchers, Prante and Bohara, do admit that applying a risk level to the model is somewhat difficult because quantifying a risk value based on future terrorist attacks is by no means an exact science. The results of their analysis indicate that states with a higher level of risk do receive more money. Furthermore, the results are inconsistent with the notions that DHS grants are considered pork-barrel spending and that congressional influence is not a positive factor when it comes to the procurement of state funding.<sup>66</sup>

Since the study was conducted 10 years ago, one most note the data indicates that influence of terrorism risk had less effect on 2006 grant allotment than in 2005 and 2004. This point is significant because it shows a trend that as the threat environment of 2001–2002 recedes, the influence of terrorism risk may have less and less impact on how DHS grants are distributed. The conclusions of Prante and Bohara’s analysis states:

we find evidence that the risk of terrorist attack is a positive and statistically significant determinant of funding. In contrast, political factors, from the perspective of both party affiliation and congressional influence are not found to positively influence funding outcomes.<sup>67</sup>

#### **D. THERE IS ALWAYS ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT**

There are several examples of success, predicated on rules and regulations, during Hurricane Katrina from pre-landfall to reconstruction. Examples of effective coordination between federal authorities and local authorities include:

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<sup>65</sup> Prante and Bohara, “What Determines Homeland Security Spending? An Econometric Analysis of the Homeland Security Grant Program,” 245.

<sup>66</sup> *Ibid.*, 252.

<sup>67</sup> *Ibid.*, 254.

- Activation of FEMA’s Hurricane Liaison Team, which coordinates with state and local authorities.<sup>68</sup>
- More than 1,000 truckloads of ice and water to five states pre-landfall.<sup>69</sup>
- Mobilization of the National Guard.<sup>70</sup>
- Daily video teleconferences between FEMA and disaster support first responders.<sup>71</sup>
- Department of Transportation (DOT) established contraflow efforts, and coordinated with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) for rapid evacuation.<sup>72</sup>
- Activation of the National Disaster Medical System, disaster medical assistance teams, and urban search and rescue.<sup>73</sup>
- Throughout the region there were pre-staged over 3.7 million liters of water, 4.6 million pounds of ice—with 13 million additional pounds of ice in cold storage ready to be deployed—and over 1.86 million meals ready to eat (MREs). Another 2.1 million MREs were positioned in logistics centers outside the region ready to be distributed.<sup>74</sup>

Pre-landfall efforts no doubt saved many lives, but the complexity of interagency communications and coordination created barriers to pre-landfall management, rather than promoting streamline operations. Even though Katrina was still 12 hours from landfall at the time, contraflow operations were shortened due to the effects of the hurricane, and the time it took to start the contraflow process.<sup>75</sup> Similarly, the FAA’s plans to keep airspace open were shortened due to pre-landfall winds.

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<sup>68</sup> White House, *The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina*, 22.

<sup>69</sup> *Ibid.*, 23.

<sup>70</sup> *Ibid.*, 24.

<sup>71</sup> *Ibid.*, 25.

<sup>72</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>73</sup> *Ibid.*, 27.

<sup>74</sup> *Ibid.*, 31.

<sup>75</sup> *Ibid.*, 29.

## **E. KATRINA LESSONS LEARNED**

It was not until September 6, 2005, when DHS and the DOJ established the Law Enforcement Coordination Center, that the situation appeared to be under control. The unified command allowed all agencies involved in the recovery and reconstruction process to feed their information to a centralized authority that could then disseminate it through the chain of command and make sure that certain processes were not duplicated and that other processes were not forgotten.

Still, there were operations, such as body recovery, that had not been planned for properly. FEMA took the lead by deploying disaster mortuary operational response teams and disaster portable morgue units to the area. An agreement was in the works with a civilian company (Kenyon International) to retrieve and transport the bodies, but the agreement fell through, leaving DOD temporarily in charge. Until the end, state and federal authorities disagreed on whose responsibility it was to take care of the deceased. Louisiana Senator Blanco accused FEMA of being unable to bypass bureaucratic red tape in its effort to finalize the contract with Kenyon International for body removal.<sup>76</sup>

Ultimately, the overall federal response to the disaster was deemed a “failure of leadership.”<sup>77</sup> The data indicates that leaders within DHS faced numerous barriers, which made effective leadership near impossible. However, DHS cannot place all the blame on barriers, and it must recognize that several preparedness problems, stemming from lack of training, were under investigation prior to the storm. A 2004 DHS training plan reported:

DHS managers and staff have expressed concerns about the effectiveness of existing training courses, lack of access to training, confusion about what training was available, lack of resources to meet unmet needs and a lack of coordination among the department’s training resources.<sup>78</sup>

This reality is very important because it identifies that even if DHS had an effective leadership program, which it did not, DHS still did not have the means to distribute the

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<sup>76</sup> White House, *The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina*, 48.

<sup>77</sup> “Katrina Response a ‘Failure’ of Leadership: Homeland Security Described as ‘Detached,’” *CNN*, February 14, 2006, <http://www.cnn.com/2006/POLITICS/02/13/katrina.congress/>.

<sup>78</sup> Steering Committee, *DHS Employee Training Plan*, 7.

training to its employees. The *DHS Employee Training Plan* report took a broad view of the training requirements and found extreme lack of oversight, unity, and accountability. Additionally, the report found that the Leadership Learning Council, which is in charge of training in each division, lacked the authority to make changes to training programs that were ineffective or mismanaged.<sup>79</sup> Moreover, the report also found that training focused mainly on non-operational topics, such as welfare programs and health services, and had no formal training programs in operational management or leadership.<sup>80</sup> Lastly, the report summarized six key findings showing the lack of training DHS employees were receiving:

- There is no overall agency training plan addressing enterprise-wide training needs, nor standards for training design, delivery, or evaluation.<sup>81</sup>
- There is no comprehensive training plan for department-wide shared services (AS, FPA, DO).<sup>82</sup>
- There is no overall strategy to adopt a learning system that blends classroom training with distance learning methods.<sup>83</sup>
- There is no overall assessment of the investment in training resources and the resulting outcomes.<sup>84</sup>
- Training equipment is dispersed throughout DHS with no central coordination.
- There has been a recent reduction in available classrooms with no offsetting.

In summary, DHS was facing major training deficiencies less than a year prior to the storm, and it paid the price for not giving adequate attention to its training deficiencies. Unfortunately, the same problems remain visible today. Later chapters discuss how the DOD is providing leadership training and offer various solutions as to how DHS can deliver these programs.

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<sup>79</sup> Steering Committee, *DHS Employee Training Plan*, 14.

<sup>80</sup> *Ibid.*, 15.

<sup>81</sup> *Ibid.*, 25.

<sup>82</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>83</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>84</sup> *Ibid.*

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### III. POST-KATRINA EXECUTIVE ORDER 13434 AND NSPD

Unfortunately, great strides in leadership training and education do not seem to occur until an accident happens or an incident demonstrates leadership failure. At that point, programs are developed rapidly, and sometimes the programs, implemented in such haste, are not focused on the root of the problem. DHS has made a lot of positive changes since Hurricane Katrina, but the changes have been slow, costly, and sometimes ineffective. This chapter examines the beginning stages of formal leadership and education programs for DHS personnel and concludes by observing data indicating either the programs are working or they need much greater attention.

After Hurricane Katrina, it became clear that DHS needed a dedicated leadership and professional development program. The result was Executive Order 13434, established May 17, 2007, which called for “establishment of a National Security Professional Development (NSPD) program for seventeen federal agencies resting on three pillars: education, training, and professional experience.”<sup>85</sup> The following account of the development of this program is a prime example of how bureaucracies create barriers to leadership—even as the agency is trying to create a leadership program.

Oversight of the National Security Professional Development Program was given to the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) Director Linda Springer, who reported to Frances Townsend and the national security advisor.<sup>86</sup> The oversight committee, known as the senior level Executive Steering Committee (ESC), released the *National Strategy for the Development of National Security Professionals* in July, which “decentralized implementation of the program to the seventeen agencies, reflecting OPM’s reluctance to move beyond guidance into oversight.”<sup>87</sup> Later the same year, just as OPM released the initial NSPD development plan, Clay Johnson became chair of the ESC. The NSPD Program had only been online for half a year, and the program was already getting a new boss just as the first NSPD implementations plan had been created. According to Morton,

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<sup>85</sup> Morton, *Next Generation Homeland Security*, 291.

<sup>86</sup> Ibid.

<sup>87</sup> Ibid.

Johnson was “[a] longtime friend of the president. Johnson was George Bush’s college roommate, his chief of staff as Texas governor, and manager of his presidential transition team.”<sup>88</sup> Johnson was also the former Office of Management and Budget director, which theoretically gave him the qualifications to oversee the NSPD Program.<sup>89</sup>

With the inception of Executive Order (EO) 13434, a second group, known as the National Security Professional Development Integration Office (NSPD-IO), was formed to assist the ESC.<sup>90</sup> Major General William A. Navas, retired Army National Guard, was put in charge of NSPD-IO. According to the chain of command, NSPD-IO had absolutely no authority over the NSPD Program; its only job was to “support the ESC and coordinate and monitor NSPD implementation.”<sup>91</sup> Navas served as the assistant secretary for manpower and reserve affairs while serving in the Army Guard, which qualified him for the job.<sup>92</sup> However, it is interesting that someone in the DOD was hired for the job, which in turn gave DHS access to DOD funds.

In 2008, the program was starting to take shape as senior executive national security professionals began taking online courses provided by FEMA, and all national security professionals (NSPs) participated in e-learning on national security. At first glance, it may seem odd that senior executives in any department involved in national security would need an online refresher on national security. In 2009, with a new president in the White House and a new administration moving into place, the NSPD Program was put on hold. The program had no legislative mandate so the new administration viewed it as the previous administration’s brain child. In 2010, the DOD transferred authority of NSPD-IO to the Executive Office of the President, and another committee was formed under the National Security Council (NSC), known as the Interagency Policy Committee.<sup>93</sup> The committee was run by NSC senior advisor Mary

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<sup>88</sup> Morton, *Next Generation Homeland Security*, 291.

<sup>89</sup> Ibid.

<sup>90</sup> Ibid.

<sup>91</sup> Ibid.

<sup>92</sup> Ibid., 292.

<sup>93</sup> Ibid.

Yates.<sup>94</sup> One of the main reasons NSPD was developed was to solve interagency issues, but as Morton states, “despite interagency efforts in 2009 and 2010, the NSPD program remained in strategic pause until early 2011.”<sup>95</sup> In February 2011, almost four years after EO 13434 and the implementation of NSPD, another NSC senior director took over the program and started NSPD 2.0.

In November 2010, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) issued a report titled *National Security: An Overview of Professional Development Activities Intended to Improve Interagency Collaboration*.<sup>96</sup> The purpose of the report was to identify gaps in knowledge, skills, training, and professional development of national security staff. The report states:

Recently, two studies have been launched to reexamine NSPD and to take a more comprehensive look at the skills, education, training, and professional experiences that interagency national security professionals need at various career stages. While awaiting the results of these studies, the NSPD executive staff is reviewing issues related to the scope and definition of national security professionals and revising the NSPD strategy and implementation plan. Several agencies reported putting implementation of their NSPD-related training and professional development activities on hold pending the results of these reviews, or other direction from the administration. In addition, the online repository of information is no longer available.<sup>97</sup>

This analysis appears to indicate much ambiguity within the NSPD program, but somehow also it drew the conclusion that DHS met most of the professional development criteria set by the GAO through short-term online or classroom courses.<sup>98</sup> It appears that the lack of standardization of the NSPD program allowed it to pass the GAO investigation of it because the GAO had no idea what it was looking for.

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<sup>94</sup> Morton, *Next Generation Homeland Security*, 292.

<sup>95</sup> *Ibid.*, 293.

<sup>96</sup> Government Accountability Office, *National Security: An Overview of Professional Development Activities Intended to Improve Interagency Coordination* (GAO 11-108) (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 2010), <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11108.pdf>.

<sup>97</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>98</sup> *Ibid.*, 7.

## **A. EFFECTIVE LEARNING INTERVENTIONS FOR DEVELOPING EXECUTIVE CORE QUALIFICATIONS**

In 2011, the NSPD-IO was transferred to OPM. According to the agency's website, DHS "offers a variety of training opportunities to employees, including academic programs, leader development, career development, mandatory training, professional development and technical skills training," and its leadership development program "helps ensure that leaders at all levels throughout the department are exposed to a core set of developmental experiences and leadership principles."<sup>99</sup>

Once NSPD was in the hands of OPM, leadership development programs were beginning to be recognized as critical tools that could enhance the federal government's capacity to provide security for the nation. OPM partnered with George Mason University to review leadership development efforts to provide enhanced methods of leadership training that would develop at the same rate as the growing threats to our nation. The four objectives identified in the report were:

- To help agencies make strategic data driven training decisions.
- To promote increased efficiencies by informing the design, development and implementation of new leadership development programs with theoretically grounded research.
- To increase training innovation, rigor, and effectiveness within federal leadership development programs.
- To provide a helpful data-driven approach for evaluating the potential effectiveness of commercial off-the-shelf development solutions offered by external vendors.<sup>100</sup>

The report concluded that leadership development comes from various learning experiences and leadership training effectiveness varies by individual and the type of

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<sup>99</sup> "Career Development," Department of Homeland Security," August 25, 2015, <https://www.dhs.gov/employee-career-development>.

<sup>100</sup> Office of Personnel Management, *Effective Learning Interventions for Developing ECQ's*, (Washington, DC: Office of Personnel Management, 2015), <https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/training-and-development/leadership-development/effective-learning-interventions-for-developing-ecqs.pdf>, 3.

instruction used.<sup>101</sup> The report included a leadership development matrix, which can be used by individuals on a daily basis, consisting of five effective learning interventions for developing executive core qualifications (EQCs) that coincide with 22 core leadership areas and six fundamental areas. These leadership areas are covered in the Senior Executive Service Candidate Program, which is for GS-15 level employees. The course runs 12–18 months and focuses on developing EQCs, strengthening leadership competencies, and cross-department exposure.<sup>102</sup> The program identifies EQC competency gaps, provides 80 hours of classroom training through American University, provides candidates with a mentor, and includes extracurricular developmental activities to increase student understanding of the DHS’s mission.<sup>103</sup>

The course is only a few years old, but it is a step in the right direction. Realizing there is a leadership development problem is the first step toward fixing it. In 2011, DHS Chief of Human Capital Officer Jeff Neil stated, “We tend to pick people because they were good doers...We make them leaders, but we don’t always develop them.”<sup>104</sup> This statement is the crux of the leadership development argument. Are organizations training personnel in leadership positions to become better leaders, or are they hoping that by the time individuals find themselves in a position of leadership they will have the tools and experience to get the job done?

## **B. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT DATA**

It should come as no surprise that if there are no programs teaching personnel how to lead, the quality of leadership within an organization may be lower than desired. One metric of DHS employees’ views on leadership within their organization is the Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey. After all, there is no point addressing the

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<sup>101</sup> Ibid.

<sup>102</sup> “Senior Executive Service Candidate Development Program: Description,” Department of Homeland Security, August 4, 2016, <https://www.dhs.gov/homeland-security-careers/senior-executive-service-development>.

<sup>103</sup> Ibid.

<sup>104</sup> “DHS Announces New Leadership Development Program For All Managers, Supervisors and Senior Executives,” FEDagent, accessed August 26, 2016, <http://www.fedagent.com/16-ereport/featured/general-news/328-dhs-announces-new-leadership-development-program-for-all-managers-supervisors-and-senior-executives>.

significance of leadership problem if there is not one in the first place. The Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey is just one of the ways that “agency leaders can help this (federal) dedicated workforce to continue to provide excellent service to the American people each and every day.”<sup>105</sup>

Conducted by the OPM, the survey is a “tool that measures employee’s perceptions of whether, and to what extent, conditions that characterize successful organizations are present in their agencies.”<sup>106</sup> The survey has been conducted since 2004, the same year that the DHS *Employee Training Plan* was published. It is taken by non-supervisors, supervisors, and executive employees, and their responses are further broken down into fulltime, part-time, and non-seasoned employees.<sup>107</sup> After the survey was completed by 392,752 personnel, it was concluded that there were “declines related to the performance of senior leaders and managers.”<sup>108</sup> For each survey given, there are specific items related directly to leadership.<sup>109</sup>

Table 1 shows percentage differences in positive responses from 2012 to 2015 with an arrow indicating the trend direction from the previous year. Trend arrows from 2014/2015 are deceiving as they only indicate minor increases from the previous year, but after a closer look, it turns out that all categories are lower over the four-year span.<sup>110</sup>

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<sup>105</sup> “Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey: Employees Influencing Change,” Office of Personnel Management, accessed September 1, 2016, <https://www.fedview.opm.gov/2014/>.

<sup>106</sup> “2014 Federal Viewpoint Survey: Employees Influencing Change,” Office of Personnel Management, accessed July 18, 2016, <http://www.fedview.opm.gov/2014/What/>.

<sup>107</sup> Ibid.

<sup>108</sup> Ibid.

<sup>109</sup> See Appendix A for the number of personnel who participate each year. See Appendix B for questions related directly to leadership and how they were viewed by federal employees as a whole in 2015. See Appendix C for response comparison between the years 2012 and 2014.

<sup>110</sup> “Government Weighted Results: Trend Analysis,” Office of Personnel Management, ““accessed July 6, 2016, <http://www.fedview.opm.gov/2015/Reports/FHCSCCompPOS.asp?AGY=ALL&SECT=5>.

Table 1. OPM Leadership Specific Questions, Items 53–62<sup>111</sup>

Question	Positive Responses				Significant Difference		
	FEVS 2012	FEVS 2013	FEVS 2014	FEVS 2015	2012/ 2013	2013/ 2014	2014/ 2015
(53) In my organization, leaders generate high levels of motivation and commitment in the workforce.	42.9%	40.8%	37.5%	39.0%	↓	↓	↑
(54) My organization's leaders maintain high standards of honesty and integrity.	55.1%	53.6%	49.5%	50.4%	↓	↓	↑
(55) Supervisors work well with employees of different backgrounds.	63.4%	62.8%	63.1%	62.9%	↓	↑	↑
(56) Managers communicate the goals and priorities of the organization.	62.4%	61.2%	58.2%	59.1%	↓	↓	↑
(57) Managers review and evaluate the organization's progress toward meeting its goals and objectives.	62.0%	60.7%	58.0%	58.8%	↓	↓	↑
(58) Managers promote communication among different work units (for example, about projects, goals, needed resources).	53.3%	52.3%	49.9%	50.5%	↓	↓	↑
(59) Managers support collaboration across work units to accomplish work objectives.	56.9%	56.1%	53.5%	54.2%	↓	↓	↑
(60) Overall, how good a job do you feel is being done by the manager directly above your immediate supervisor?	57.9%	57.0%	56.0%	56.8%	↓	↓	↑
(61) I have a high level of respect for my organization's senior leaders.	54.1%	52.3%	50.1%	51.4%	↓	↓	↑
(62) Senior leaders demonstrate support for work/life programs.	54.0%	53.7%	52.3%	53.4%	↓	↓	↑

<sup>111</sup> Adapted from Office of Personnel Management, "Government Weighted Results."

These survey results are not the sole evidence of a leadership problem at DHS. For example, the Human Capital Assessment and Accountability Framework used four metrics to analyze how DHS compared to 38 other agencies in the areas listed as follows and ranked them in order. DHS scored last, or next to last, in each of the four categories.<sup>112</sup>

1. Leadership and management—next to last
2. Results-oriented performance culture—last
3. Talent management—next to last
4. Job satisfaction—last<sup>113</sup>

All these leadership issues are causing real problems for DHS. Overall employee satisfaction rates for the department are at the lowest point since the agency's inception. As stated by the *Washington Times*, "Homeland Security was one of the Worst Overall, continuing a downward trend that's seen its satisfaction rate drop from 62 percent in 2010 to 47 percent now, or 5 percentage points below the next worse."<sup>114</sup> Thus, it seems safe to conclude that DHS leadership training programs need much more work. NSPD programs need to be available for all personnel, not just the Senior Executive Service. Furthermore, the delivery system of such leadership and training tools must be adequate so all personnel can access them at any time, as well as be trackable instead of relying on the self-reporting system. While it is impossible to conclude that perception of leadership failure in an organization is an actual leadership failure, the data that indicate DHS leadership has reached an all-time low over the past decade is enough to determine that in this case; perception is the reality.

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<sup>112</sup> "Human Capital Management: Leadership and Knowledge Management," Office of Personnel Management, accessed July 6, 2016, <https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/human-capital-management/leadership-knowledge-management/>.

<sup>113</sup> Ibid.

<sup>114</sup> Stephen Dinan, "Homeland Security Ranks as Worst Federal Agency for Employees," *Washington Times*, September 28, 2015, <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/sep/28/homeland-security-ranks-as-worst-federal-agency-fo/?page=all>.

## IV. HISTORY OF U.S. NAVY LEADERSHIP TRAINING

Similar to DHS, the Navy did not get serious about implementing leadership training and education programs until a major incident occurred. This chapter shows similarities between the development of the U.S. Navy's leadership training programs and DHS's attempts at developing one. It also provides examples of leadership training development techniques that DHS can adopt. By showing the Navy's leadership training progression from a lean management process to a more developed human resources approach to leadership training, DHS can examine the pros and cons of the Navy's leadership training history to develop a program that is best suited for DHS.

In 1972, the USS *Kitty Hawk* and the USS *Constellation* experienced riots that the media portrayed as race-related. However, the underlying cause was actually senior leadership's inability to control ship demonstrations protesting the Vietnam War.<sup>115</sup> In an attempt to understand what went wrong, Congress in 1973 undertook a study, which concluded:

One of the most alarming features of the investigation was the discovery of lack of leadership by middle management in the Navy. It became apparent that while junior officers, chief petty officers and senior petty officers were performing their technical duties in a proficient manner, there was a lack of leadership in dealing with the seamen.<sup>116</sup>

The study led to the development of the Navy's Leadership and Management Training courses, which were separated into more than 150 sub-courses—with no real oversight.<sup>117</sup> The programs were described as having no “standardized curriculum, no attendance requirements, and generally consisted of lecture-format delivery of Navy tradition, rules, and regulations, combined with selected (non-standardized) management theory.”<sup>118</sup>

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<sup>115</sup> Center for Personal and Professional Development [CPPD], *Project Report: Enlisted Leadership Requirements Review* (Dam Neck, VA: Center for Personal and Professional Development, 2015), ii.

<sup>116</sup> Ibid.

<sup>117</sup> Ibid

<sup>118</sup> Ibid., 7.

For the next three decades the Navy attempted to form effective leadership training through various programs, including Leadership Management Training, Leadership Management Education and Training, and the Navy Leader Development Program.<sup>119</sup> Each program was incrementally better than the last as training methods were based on “extensive data collection and analysis on the skills, behaviors and performance of successful Sailors in various roles.”<sup>120</sup> These competencies continued to evolve as the Navy searched for more effective ways to predict job performance. At the same time, the leadership program length was adjusted from two weeks to ten days, readjusted to nine days, and finally shortened to five days.<sup>121</sup> In 2009, the program was shortened again to three days, and the majority of training responsibility was turned over to the parent command, rather than being held in a formal training classroom.<sup>122</sup>

Almost 40 years after implementing a formal training model, the Navy has come full circle: the lack of updated, effective, leadership education and training is contributing to commanding officers being fired at a rate never seen before; incidents are carried out by sailors abroad causing high visibility international relation problems; and a growing erosion of distrust between subordinates and senior leaders is increasing negative impacts throughout the fleet, including poor retention rates.<sup>123</sup> A white paper written by Captain Mark F. Light expressed concerned over the systemic problem of senior leaders being fired for personal misconduct.<sup>124</sup> One of the many conclusions presented by Light was that the “absence of training for all officers to a set standard has led to a failure of leadership.”<sup>125</sup> Although the Navy is effective at distributing training material to its personnel, it lacks proper leadership training modules for sailors at all levels.<sup>126</sup> This

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<sup>119</sup> CPPD, *Project Report*, 7.

<sup>120</sup> Ibid.

<sup>121</sup> Ibid.

<sup>122</sup> Ibid.

<sup>123</sup> Guy Snodgrass, “Keep a Weather Eye on the Horizon: A Navy Officer Retention Study,” *Navy War College Review* 67, no. 4 (2014): 76.

<sup>124</sup> Mark Light, “The Navy’s Moral Compass: Commanding Officers and Personal Misconduct,” *Naval War College Review* 65, no. 3 (2012): 136.

<sup>125</sup> Ibid., 148.

<sup>126</sup> Ibid.

situation creates a gap, similar to EQC gaps identified by DHS, wherein individuals are able to decide what type of organizational training applies to them because the organization has failed to provide standardized leadership training.

In 2015, the Center for Personal and Professional Development (CCPD) collected data from 2500 sailors to assess the current state of Navy leadership training.<sup>127</sup> Its analysis found several negative impacts attributed to current training including quality, length, poor instruction, and lack of preparation.<sup>128</sup> The data collected came from four sources:

1. End of course student critiques
2. Task-type work time
3. Fleet assessment of Leadership Competencies
4. Focus Groups.<sup>129</sup>

The results concluded, “the Fleet considers the current training preparation for technical, managerial and leadership roles as inadequate.”<sup>130</sup> Scores for end-of-course surveys fell below the Center for Personal and Professional Development standards, and the shift in leadership responsibilities among the ranks has gone almost unnoticed by the command structure. Survey respondents showed strong concern regarding training that is conducted at the command level, and the majority endorsed the idea of returning leadership training to the schoolhouse. Furthermore, respondents also noted training at the command level is easily interrupted as instructors are distracted by work priorities and operational tempo, which results in inadequate training.

The CCPD findings of the survey are summarized through six key issues:

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<sup>127</sup> CPPD, *Project Report*, iii.

<sup>128</sup> Ibid., 1.

<sup>129</sup> Ibid., 3.

<sup>130</sup> Ibid., 10.

1. Management and leadership responsibilities lie more heavily on the higher-ranking officers and petty officers than in the past.
2. Leadership objectives set by the chief of naval operations (CNO) are not being met.
3. Leadership training programs are so short that instructors are unable to fit all the necessary content within time constraints.
4. Naval leadership values are not being taught at the command level on a routine basis.
5. Command training is sometimes hindered by the fact that personnel do not want to interact with their superiors on issues regarding leadership in fear that they might say the wrong things.
6. The mentorship program in the Navy is underutilized and often thought of as just another requirement.<sup>131</sup>

The CCPD's findings validate issues that have largely been ignored. Management and leadership responsibilities have fallen on the shoulders of the select few who are fortunate enough to make it through the career gauntlet with only minor infractions. Once at the top, senior leaders realize that everything they worked for could be lost if too many mistakes are made by their subordinates. This mindset has created the Navy's current risk-averse culture and zero-defects standards, resulting in bosses' micro managing and not allowing sailors to learn on the job by making mistakes in non-combat environments. Junior sailors end up being less than adequately trained, which results in either more mistakes or their inability to complete tasks on their own, therefore shifting more responsibility to their superiors.

As leadership training continues to decrease in quality, length, and overall scope, the Navy has shifted its focus to other modes and media for training.<sup>132</sup> Command-based training and computer-based training are perceived as cost beneficial and a great way for commands to schedule training around operations, but the results show that command leadership training is ineffective due to a myriad of factors, including: "funding

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<sup>131</sup> CPPD, *Project Report*, 16.

<sup>132</sup> Romero and Loesch, *Delivery of Naval Leadership Training*, 18.

reductions, expanding mission tasking, growing operational threats from international terrorist organizations, manning level and billet instability, promotion and career longevity uncertainty, modifications to technical training content and duration, etc.”<sup>133</sup>

The CPPD’s recommendations include updating the training programs for senior petty officers, evaluating and revising the FITREP and evaluation system, determining the cost of moving leadership training back to training commands, and evaluating command climate issues that are barriers to leadership goals.<sup>134</sup> The Center for Naval Leadership (CNL), previously based in Dam Neck Virginia, now known as the Naval Leadership and Ethics Center in Newport Rhode Island, has come to the conclusion that the Navy’s blending learning solutions are the optimum method for training delivery. In addition, a CNL report cites the Chief Petty Officer Selectee Program as a prime example of a blended learning solution success.<sup>135</sup>

After releasing its results, the CPPD, along with other leadership training elements, has since been shut down. During their time of disestablishment, at least five leadership training courses were put in either a hold status pending review or cancellation.<sup>136</sup> Does this development mean the research the CPPD conducted is invalid, or is the information it collected not what the bosses wanted to hear?

#### **A. IDENTIFYING LEADERSHIP COMPETENCIES**

A similar study to the CNL study, titled Naval Leadership Training Study, was conducted in 2007 by the Human Performance Center (HPC) with the CNL. It concluded, “continued analysis and evaluation of established processes in the Leadership Development Continuum and examination of how they benchmark with current and future processes offered by other military branches and those within the civilian sector.”<sup>137</sup> The first goal was to discover how different branches within the DOD provided leadership training and

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<sup>133</sup> CPPD, *Project Report*, 15.

<sup>134</sup> CPPD, *Project Report*, 17.

<sup>135</sup> *Ibid.*, 57.

<sup>136</sup> Romero and Loesosch, *Delivery of Naval Leadership Training*, ii.

<sup>137</sup> *Ibid.*

which methods were most effective. The second goal was to identify whether quality of training was more effective at institutional sites, such as the Center for Naval Leadership, or through other methods, such as command delivered training, blended learning solutions, and electronic-based training.<sup>138</sup>

CNL bases all of its leadership training on its naval leadership competency model (NLCM). The model was built through a collective effort of six different agencies involved in creating leadership training material.<sup>139</sup> The agencies are made up of system matter experts, who can deliver current and comprehensive knowledge of what is happening in the fleet. These individuals include top-notch sailors, hand selected from “Commander Fleet Forces Command (CFFC), Learning Centers within the NPDC domain, Naval Service Training Command (NSTC), NPDC, and NETC Instructional System Specialists (ISS).”<sup>140</sup> The model is used to ensure that all sailors achieve specific leadership training at key points in their career, points which are determined by fleet requirements. Essentially, the NLCM is the link that ties the needs of the fleet to what sailors are being taught. See Figures 3 and 4.

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<sup>138</sup> Romero and Loesosch, *Delivery of Naval Leadership Training*, ii.

<sup>139</sup> Ibid., 4.

<sup>140</sup> Ibid.

Figure 3. Fleet Requirements of Enlisted Sailors<sup>141</sup>




Figure 4. Fleet Requirements for Officers<sup>142</sup>



<sup>141</sup> Source: Romero and Loesch, *Delivery of Naval Leadership Training*, 4.

<sup>142</sup> Source: Romero and Loesch, *Delivery of Naval Leadership Training*, 6.

## **B. NAVY LEADERSHIP COMPETENCY MODEL**

Naval leadership hypothesized that by basing leadership training off the NLCM (see Figure 5), leadership performance could be measured. The first sign it was working was the development of a new chief petty officer (CPO) transition program. This programed marked the first time the CPO transition program had been updated in 15 years.<sup>143</sup> Previously known as Chief's Initiation, past elements of the transition process from first class petty officer to chief petty officer were tightly held. In keeping with Navy tradition, some of these elements are still held secret. Now however, with new coursework, updated training instructions, and formal classroom teachings, the new CPO mess can to carry out leadership directives from the CNO while maintaining its "Goat Locker" traditions. Initiation events, such as cross-dressing, diaper-wearing, sleep deprivation, and drinking the grog, have all but been abolished and replaced with a more professional selection process, including dropping the term "initiation" from the process.<sup>144</sup> During this time, the division officer and department head leadership courses were also updated.<sup>145</sup>


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<sup>143</sup> Romero and Loesch, *Delivery of Naval Leadership Training*, 5.

<sup>144</sup> "Tough Chief Induction Rules," *Military Times*, July 15, 2013, <http://www.militarytimes.com/story/military/archives/2013/07/15/tough-chief-induction-rules/78541098/>.

<sup>145</sup> CPPD, *Project Report*, 6.

Figure 5. Naval Leadership Competency Model<sup>146</sup>



### C. EMPHASIS ON E-LEARNING

Around the same time the Navy was implementing new alternatives to leadership training, the Marines, Army, Air Force, and the Coast Guard were using distance learning to teach leadership. Although each branch was using its own combination of training methods, all services were using e-learning as “the foremost-utilized distance learning tool across the services and is used primarily as an independent self-improvement instrument.”<sup>147</sup> The Army’s Distributed Learning program consists of over 2,500 courses, a few hundred of which are for leadership and management training.<sup>148</sup> The Air Force, similar to the Navy, has an Intranet application that allows airmen to navigate a wide variety of training, including programs from Ivy League colleges, NETg, SkillSoft, and other government applications.<sup>149</sup>

<sup>146</sup> Source: Romero and Loesosch, *Delivery of Naval Leadership Training*, 4.

<sup>147</sup> CPPD, *Project Report*, 11.

<sup>148</sup> CPPD, *Project Report*.

<sup>149</sup> *Ibid.*, 12.

The DOD has convinced itself that not only is electronic distance learning one of the most valuable tools for its personnel, but it is very cost effective for the amount of training that can be conducted. Although e-learning has proven to be cost effective, the HPC report does not advocate e-learning as the most effective means of leadership training. A 2007 report cites a study conducted by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), which found that classroom training outranked all other forms of training. The MIT study further concluded, “The ability to ask questions with the capability of receiving accurate feedback and collaborative learning were viewed as key components” for the student learning process.<sup>150</sup>

Furthermore, the idea that command delivered training is more cost beneficial is true only on case-by-case basis. A preliminary cost evaluation between command delivered training (CDT) and training conducted in the more formal schoolhouse showed CDT was \$10,889,322 more expensive, which is approximately double the cost than in schoolhouse training.<sup>151</sup>

#### **D. MENTORSHIP**

Data from the 2014 Navy retention survey shows that mentorship programs are highly underrated—and underutilized. The survey states, “Despite the recognized importance of having a mentor shepherd a service member through their respective career paths, 42.8% of Sailors report they do not have a mentor outside of any formal assignments.”<sup>152</sup> The survey also shows that both the aviation and surface community, 49.3 percent and 54.6 percent respectively, responded that they rely on a mentor over their commanding officer, executive officer, department head, and detailer for advice regarding their careers (see Table 2).

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<sup>150</sup> Ibid., 48.

<sup>151</sup> CDDP, *Project Report*, 59.

<sup>152</sup> Snodgrass “Keep a Weather Eye on the Horizon,” 19.

Table 2. Aviation and Surface Warfare<sup>153</sup>

Aviation			Surface		
Commanding Officer	699	46.8%	Commanding Officer	1262	40.4%
Executive Officer	532	35.6%	Executive Officer	948	30.3%
Department Head	545	36.5%	Department Head	946	30.3%
Peers	1056	70.7%	Peers	2131	68.1%
Detailers	258	17.3%	Detailers	724	23.2%
Spouse/Fiancée/ Significant Other	526	35.2%	Spouse/Fiancée/ Significant Other	1108	35.4%
Mentor	737	49.3%	Mentor	1706	54.6%
Social Media	69	4.6%	Social Media	161	5.1%

It is difficult to determine if mentorship programs are successful in services like the Army and Marines, which do not have formal mentorship programs. Instead, command officers in these branches informally counsel interested subordinates to find a mentor. On the other hand, the Air Force and Coast Guard both have policy directives mandating a formal mentor program. The Air Force's directive 36-3401 states, "Commanders are responsible for promoting a robust mentoring program within their unit. The immediate supervisor or rater is designated as the primary mentor (coach, guide, role model, etc.) for each of his or her subordinates."<sup>154</sup> The USCG policy outlined in COM5350.24C is less defined and states that individuals should participate in mentorship programs, but ultimately it is up to individuals to take care of their personal and professional development.<sup>155</sup>

## E. NAVY EMPLOYEE SURVEY DATA

The Navy conducts personnel surveys similar to those of OPM. Analysis of sailor responses can be used to displays similarities between how DHS employees and sailors feel about the current state organizational leadership.

<sup>153</sup> Guy Snodgrass, *2014 Survey Report* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2014), <http://www.military.com/PDF/2014-Navy-Retention-Study-Report-Full.pdf>.

<sup>154</sup> Ibid.

<sup>155</sup> Ibid., 13.

## **1. Sailors Leaving Because of Poor Leadership**

In an attempt to understand why talented sailors are voluntarily deciding to leave the Navy, an independent study called the 2014 Navy Retention Survey was designed and conducted by active duty sailors. By taking statements from more than 5,000 sailors, the study brought to light current problems with talent management and senior leadership. Three core areas were targeted to place a value on how sailors felt about quality of work, quality of life, and quality of leadership, all of which combined make up what the survey defines as quality of service.<sup>156</sup> Although both quality of work and quality of life have much to do with leadership, I will only be analyzing quality of leadership.

Key findings in the survey exposed two naval leadership flaws: sailors desiring leadership positions with increased responsibility are decreasing, and there is a large degree of distrust of those in senior leadership positions. The survey results show that half of responding sailors do not want their bosses' job. Comments indicate an increasing belief that

positions of senior leadership, specifically operational command, is less desirable because of increasing risk aversion (68.7 percent), high administrative burden (56.4 percent), and, in some cases, a pay inversion where commanding officers are paid up to 10 percent less than the mid-career officers they lead.<sup>157</sup>

Furthermore, almost 40 percent of sailors believe that senior leadership is less than adequate, indicating a lack of trust between seniors and subordinates, and more than 50 percent believe that senior leaders do not care what their subordinates think or hold themselves to the same standards they hold their subordinates to.<sup>158</sup>

## **2. Poor Leadership and Risk Aversion**

One key aspect, as the survey has shown, is risk and risk-aversion in the armed forces today. On the one hand, the risks that go with most military jobs, if not taken seriously, can result in damage to equipment and personnel or, in the most serious cases, death. Thus, the armed services have a plethora of risk mitigation publications. In April

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<sup>156</sup> Ibid., 17.

<sup>157</sup> Ibid., 3.

<sup>158</sup> Ibid.

1998, the Army published FM 100–14 dealing with managing risk.<sup>159</sup> In 2006, FM 100–14 was replaced by FM 5–19 and given the new name, *Composite Risk Management*. Now called ATP 5–19, the Army, like the Navy and other branches, is using operational risk management to mitigate risk during all phases of a service member’s life, including off-duty activities.

While the success of these programs can be seen in organizations like the aviation community, there is a problem with attempting to identify all risk through risk matrices. Kent Wall describes how risk matrices attempt to provide an easy measure of risk, but ultimately they produce an irrelevant portrayal of information because they do not account for the desired outcome of the user.<sup>160</sup> Therefore, a two-dimensional matrix using probability and severity will eventually lead the user to believe that if all proper precautions are not taken, an undesirable outcome will occur.<sup>161</sup> Ultimately, this mindset will result in leaders being unwilling to make a decision as they fear that no matter what choice they make, it will inevitably lead to a mistake.<sup>162</sup> Fear of making a mistake resulting in less than optimum performance is considered a risk-averse environment.

To further exacerbate the fear of making a mistake, service members are increasingly fearful of the zero-defect mentality. Ensign Bethany Craft, who provided her capstone essay “End the Zero-defects Mentality” to *Proceedings* magazine, wrote, “The one mistake you’re out mentality is rampant, which means that all mistakes and crimes become the same mistake, because the punishment is the same.”<sup>163</sup> While some might conclude that an ensign does not have the fleet experience to comment on such issues, current leadership must evaluate these observations and realize that future leaders of the Navy already view the organization this way.

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<sup>159</sup> Department of the Army, *Risk Management* (ATP5-19) (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2014), [http://www.benning.army.mil/rangeops/content/blank\\_forms/ATP\\_5-19RiskManagement\\_Apr14.pdf](http://www.benning.army.mil/rangeops/content/blank_forms/ATP_5-19RiskManagement_Apr14.pdf).

<sup>160</sup> Kent Wall, “The Trouble with Risk Matrices,” (working paper, Naval Postgraduate School, 2011), <http://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/32570>.

<sup>161</sup> *Ibid.*, 8.

<sup>162</sup> *Ibid.*, 9.

<sup>163</sup> Bethany Craft, “End the Zero Defect Mentality,” *Proceedings* 124 (July 1988): 145.

Table 3 shows the results when sailors were asked if they believed the Navy had a risk-averse culture.<sup>164</sup> The data concludes, “68.7% of Sailors agree or strongly agree when asked if ‘the Navy has a risk averse culture,’ officers (86.3%) are significantly more pessimistic than their enlisted counterparts (46.4%).”<sup>165</sup>

Table 3. Perception of a Risk-Averse Culture<sup>166</sup>

	<b>Enlisted</b>	<b>Officer</b>
<b>Strongly Agree or Agree</b>	42.3%	75.0%
<b>Neutral</b>	31.7%	14.1%
<b>Disagree or Strongly Disagree</b>	18.4%	8.3%
<b>Do Not Know</b>	7.7%	2.6%

Table 4 shows the results when sailors were asked if the Navy had a zero defect mentality. The data of the 2014 survey concludes, “60.6% agreeing with this statement. Officers are once again decidedly more pessimistic than their enlisted counterparts, with 75% of officers agreeing or strongly agreeing, as compared to 42.3% of enlisted.”<sup>167</sup>

Table 4. Perception of a Zero Defect Mentality<sup>168</sup>

	<b>Enlisted</b>	<b>Officer</b>
<b>Strongly Agree or Agree</b>	46.4%	86.3%
<b>Neutral</b>	33.7%	8.5%
<b>Disagree or Strongly Disagree</b>	10.7%	4.2%
<b>Do Not Know</b>	9.1%	1.0%

These numbers alone do not sound any alarms indicating that something is wrong with leadership. If the Navy has chosen to operate in a risk-averse environment stemming

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<sup>164</sup> Guy Snodgrass, *2014 Survey Report* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2014), <http://www.military.com/PDF/2014-Navy-Retention-Study-Report-Full.pdf>, 18.

<sup>165</sup> Ibid.

<sup>166</sup> Adapted from Snodgrass, *2014 Survey Report*, 18.

<sup>167</sup> Snodgrass, *2014 Survey Report*, 18.

<sup>168</sup> Adapted from Snodgrass, *2014 Survey Report*, 18.

from a zero-defect mentality resulting in fewer mishaps, these positive results should correlate to quality senior leadership, subordinates trusting their leaders, and senior leaders who are tune with the needs of their subordinates. However, this is not the case. Tables 5–8 indicate, as per the 2014 survey results, that quality of leadership, trust in leadership, leadership safekeeping, and leadership accountability are overall viewed in a negative manner.

Table 5. “Quality of Navy Senior Leadership”<sup>169</sup>

	<b>Enlisted</b>	<b>Officer</b>
<b>Excellent or Good</b>	26.9%	31.7%
<b>Neutral</b>	25.8%	27.9%
<b>Marginal or Poor</b>	46.7%	39.9%
<b>Do Not Know</b>	0.6%	0.4%

Table 6. “I Trust the Navy’s Senior Leaders”<sup>170</sup>

	<b>Enlisted</b>	<b>Officer</b>
<b>Excellent or Good</b>	29.2%	31.9%
<b>Neutral</b>	27.0%	31.0%
<b>Marginal or Poor</b>	41.7%	33.6%
<b>Do Not Know</b>	2.0%	3.4%

Table 7. “Senior Leaders Care about What I Think”<sup>171</sup>

	<b>Enlisted</b>	<b>Officer</b>
<b>Agree</b>	18.1%	18.2%
<b>Neutral</b>	28.6%	32.1%
<b>Disagree</b>	53.3%	49.7%

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<sup>169</sup> Adapted from Snodgrass, *2014 Survey Report*, 18.

<sup>170</sup> Adapted from Snodgrass, *2014 Survey Report*.

<sup>171</sup> Adapted from Snodgrass, *2014 Survey Report*, 19.

Table 8. “Senior Leaders Hold Themselves Accountable”<sup>172</sup>

	<b>Enlisted</b>	<b>Officer</b>
<b>Agree</b>	18.2%	21.5%
<b>Neutral</b>	27.8%	31.6%
<b>Disagree</b>	54.1%	46.9%

These survey results show that the current perception of a zero-defects work environment, and the perception that senior leaders do not appear to be taking responsibility for their own actions, results in subordinates feeling that each decision they make may be their last if the results are anything less than spectacular. In her article, Ensign Craft goes on to say, “the zero-defect mentality seems to foster an environment where military personnel compromise their integrity to keep from risking their career.”<sup>173</sup> In a hypothetical situation wherein leaders do not hold themselves accountable and subordinates are too afraid to make a decision, the outcome will certainly be less than the highest standard the Navy always seeks to achieve.

In summary, DHS and the Navy both have lessons to learn about being proactive when implementing leadership training, but the leadership training programs of the Navy and other branches are more developed than those of DHS. While implementing organizational-wide leadership training after a leadership failure event has occurred will likely decrease the same failures from happening again, it is much more desirable to develop these programs first in an attempt to mitigate leadership failures. Furthermore, DHS does not have to learn the hard way that senior employees are not the only ones who need the training. The initial leadership failures that drove the Navy to develop new leadership training programs was the recognition that low ranking individuals were the ones most in need of such training. This fact should be a warning to DHS as it is currently implementing its leadership training using a top-down approach.<sup>174</sup>

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<sup>172</sup> Adapted from Snodgrass, *2014 Survey Report*.

<sup>173</sup> Craft, “End the Zero Defect Mentality,” 145.

<sup>174</sup> Government Accountability Office, *DHS Training: Improved Documentation, Resource Tracking, and Performance Measurement Could Strengthen Efforts* (GAO 16–688) (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 2014), <http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-688>, 2.

The Navy's history of leadership program implementation shows that the process of developing effective leadership programs is not easy and needs constant attention. DHS must understand that distributing leadership training material through online and distance learning mechanisms may result in the opposite of one of the objectives of the DHS leadership development program, which is to maintain accountability over programs that are not administered by people. Also, DHS should implement a formal mentorship program throughout the ranks. Having a mentor gives subordinates a feedback loop that can be formal or informal, provides them with a source of experience and knowledge, and provides a backup to non-personalized training, such as e-learning. Lastly, and in the author's opinion most important, is recognizing that individuals will make mistakes as they develop as leaders. It is up to senior leadership, mentors, bosses, and supervisors to not only let individuals make mistakes as they grow within the ranks of DHS, but also let them know that it is ok to make mistakes in the training environment and even operationally if the mistake is minor. A zero-defect organizational climate, combined with a risk-averse culture, is the least likely place for leadership development to occur.

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## **V. THE FUTURE OF DHS LEADERSHIP TRAINING**

This thesis has identified three essential factors and six sub-factors that are required to have an effective leadership training program. The DOD experience with all of them makes for an illuminating comparison to DHS. In this chapter, I evaluate the three essential factors required for an effective leadership training program, as well as their sub-components, which are the building blocks of the program.

### **A. TRAINING MATERIAL**

The first essential factor is training material. DHS has yet to determine which leadership characteristics it wishes to see in all its employees, and thus, all attempts at leadership training have been broad strokes of forced education with no clear goal in mind. To develop adequate training material, DHS must develop a model to address desired outcomes, standardize training for all DHS components, evaluate the material for effectiveness, and hold employees accountable for completing the training.

#### **1. Develop a Model**

The Navy relies on its leadership competency model as the foundation for leadership training. According to CNL, “The NLCM initiative ensures Sailors achieve specific leadership training milestones within their career,” and “formal reviews of the NLCM are utilized to modify, change, or revise training requirements.”<sup>175</sup> These reviews have formulated conclusions on what methods are best to train sailors, what type of leadership skills they need throughout their career, and when they need them. The methodology is not perfect, but this is where the DOD is succeeding and DHS is failing. DOD and DHS will always be unable to provide the latest and greatest leadership training because the amount of time it takes for a government entity to determine a new methods effectiveness, package it into training material, and then analyze the results is a long

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<sup>175</sup> Romero and Loesch, *Delivery of Naval Leadership Training*, 4.

process.<sup>176</sup> However, what the Navy has done is establish a baseline requirement for leadership training and its delivery. DHS has yet to follow suit.

The DHS *Employee Training Plan*, written in 2004 and updated in 2009, recommended the creation of teams to “formalize DHS Training Design and Delivery Standards that strengthen the effectiveness of the time and effort spent in training at DHS,” and to create an Employee Training Plan Steering Committee to work with the Learning Leadership Council.<sup>177</sup> A 2014 GAO report, written to follow up on these recommendations, concluded that DHS’s Leadership Development Program was still in the process of developing a model for building leadership skills and that the office “has not clearly identified program goals and the measures it uses to assess program effectiveness.”<sup>178</sup>

At the moment, the author believes that the Leader Development Framework,<sup>179</sup> consisting of a five-tiered approach, which is intended to reach all DHS employees through seven modules of leadership training, is the most comprehensive plan to date. Furthermore, this plan, unlike previous plans, is actually being implemented throughout DHS and, if nothing else, is receiving feedback from various supervisors and managers.

## **2. Standardization**

If leadership training is not standardized, it will be impossible to measure the effectiveness of the material. For too long, individual DHS departments have claimed that their component would not benefit from standardized training because their methods are far too different from their counterparts. This excuse was a contributing factor to the failures during Hurricane Katrina, and these do not need to be repeated. The case of the DOD is a prime example of how a large organization with far more personnel than DHS can create standardized training material for its members. It would be beneficial for DHS

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<sup>176</sup> Government Accountability Office, *DHS Training*, 2.

<sup>177</sup> Steering Committee, *DHS Employee Training Plan*, 43.

<sup>178</sup> Government Accountability Office, *DHS Training*, intro.

<sup>179</sup> See Appendix D for leader development framework.

to explore how the DOD determines what type of training it considers mandatory for all leaders and how it decides on the frequency of its delivery.

### **3. Evaluation and Accountability**

DHS cannot rely on leadership training self-reporting. In a perfect world, one would expect DHS and DOD employees to complete all required training because it is important to them and because they value the information their organization expects them to learn. Sadly, this is not the case. DHS is recognizing the fact that evaluation and feedback on training is essential. The 2009 update to the DHS *Employee Training Plan* stated:

With evaluation data, DHS gains greater insight into precisely where training creates value and when other interventions, such as job aids, might be more cost effective. As stewards of public resources, it is imperative that DHS be in a position to better describe the return on investment that training brings.<sup>180</sup>

However, in a 2014 statement to the chair on homeland security and governmental affairs, the GAO reported that since 2003, DHS has been unable to evaluate and assess skills based training within the department.<sup>181</sup>

In 2014, DHS attempted to assess the quality of its training through linkage, clarity, and measurable target.<sup>182</sup> Linkage is the tie between training and program goals. Critics of the leadership development program have stated that they are unable to determine how some of their programs related to the overall goal of DHS. Clarity describes the many abstract terms and phrases that the LPD uses within the training itself. Examples include phrase such as “best practices” and “developmental activity.” Critics argue that some of the instruction is too vague and therefore difficult, if not impossible, to teach and understand. Targets are a bit vague as well. I believe that in the future, DHS will develop something similar to the Navy’s fleet requirements, which will allow DHS

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<sup>180</sup> Steering Committee, *DHS Employee Training Plan*, 37.

<sup>181</sup> Government Accountability Office, *DHS Training*, 2.

<sup>182</sup> *Ibid.*, 36.

to ensure that employees hit certain targets throughout their career track. The 2014 report states,

developing measurable targets could help DHS determine whether the program's performance is meeting expectations. To set appropriate targets, however, it will be important for the LDP Office to first clearly identify program goals and ensure its performance measures link to the goals.<sup>183</sup>

This statement reinforces the need for a model that identifies and clarifies DHS's leadership goals.

## **B. DELIVERY MECHANISM**

Second, DHS must develop a delivery system to ensure that all employees have access to leadership training material. Although the DOD may not possess or implement the most cutting edge theories on leadership development, it does have the means to deliver the training it has, which is something DHS has yet to achieve. DHS has a vast amount of experience in its ranks from personnel who have been involved in homeland security operations since 9/11. These individuals are prime candidates for participation in focus groups and think tanks, the sole focus of which would be to figure out what type of periodic leadership training will benefit the organization the most and how and when it should be delivered.

DHS must consider all types of training delivery when developing and incorporating leadership training throughout the ranks. DHS Training Plan Steering Committee expressed its opinion that e-learning would change the way DHS trained its employees.<sup>184</sup> Additionally, it stated five key areas where e-learning would have the most effect on training delivery:<sup>185</sup>

- Increasing access to training resources
- Increasing consistency of training materials for program delivery
- Increasing access to quality training materials

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<sup>183</sup> Ibid., 39.

<sup>184</sup> Steering Committee, *DHS Employee Training Plan*, 39.

<sup>185</sup> Ibid.

- Reducing travel and per diem expenses associated with training
- Reducing loss of productivity due to travel.

Each reason has merit but also carries hidden consequences. Using e-learning for increased access and program delivery may make it easier for DHS to deliver its training products, but it does not ensure they will be used. The DOD has thousands of online training tools, but only a few are regarded as annual training requirements, and the rest are not given the same amount of attention. The author believes that DHS's reasoning behind increased e-learning capacity lies more on the fourth and fifth purposes, which are purely financial. Incorporating financial efficiencies into any training model is likely to be at the top of the priority list. However, it should never be higher than the overall objective of delivering effective training and making sure that employees are actually engaging the material. Furthermore, e-learning programs must be developed so they are not susceptible to the point-and-click level of training. (This is where individuals pay minimal attention to the material as they are only concerned with reaching the end of the lesson to fulfill the training requirement).

DHS has already identified that a blended method of training delivery is the most effective. Just as e-learning can be ineffective due to the lack of engagement verification for the user, classroom lectures can be just as ineffective for those who choose to approach lecture as a passive learning activity. Leadership training should be given through various platforms, such as e-learning, classroom training, group interaction, scenario based training, and teach back instruction. There is no perfect method to leadership training because individuals absorb material in different ways. Therefore, using a blending of solutions should create the best chance of training the largest number of individuals.

### **C. IMPLEMENTATION**

Lastly, DHS must implement these changes. It can no longer wait for a 100 percent effective leadership program because this ideal does not exist. The program must be implemented and evaluated before the fine tuning can occur. One way to implement

these changes is by targeting career milestones. Individuals will need to learn new leadership skills as they progress through the ranks, and it is up to DHS to decide who receives what type of training and when. Promotion windows are a great opportunity to implement new training. The answer should not be “learn as you go;” rather, it should be a proactive approach to leadership training through all levels and phases of one’s career. Also, DHS must deliver leadership training to all employees simultaneously, rather than starting with the SES and working its way down. This type of approach will leave non-SES and supervisor personnel feeling as if senior leadership is out of touch with the general workforce, which will lead to the continual and gradual decline—as I have observed in OPM surveys.

### **1. Milestones**

On paper, it appears that DHS has identified its shortcomings and has in fact set target dates to fix what was broken as well as develop new programs as necessary. In 2004, DHS identified a need for leadership training, and shortly thereafter the employee training plan was established. When the employee training plan was updated in 2009, it contained many of the same recommendations in 2004, as if nothing had changed. In 2010, DHS formed the Leadership Development Program (LDP), and in 2011, it developed the Leadership Development Framework to develop a five-year plan to implement the LDP.<sup>186</sup> It is apparent that leadership training and development programs have been kicked down the road for the last seven years. Leaders of the programs or initiatives need to be accountable for not developing programs in a timely manner. In 2012, DHS spent 1.1 billion on training and education.<sup>187</sup> It is hard to believe that a standard, organization-wide leadership program takes several billion dollars and nearly a decade to complete.

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<sup>186</sup> Government Accountability Office, *DHS Training*, 10.

<sup>187</sup> *Ibid.*, 2.

## **2. Bottom-up Approach**

The DOD recognizes that its newest members are also future leaders and therefore places a strong emphasis on leadership training for junior personnel. DHS has identified five categories of employees within its organizations: executive, manager, supervisor, team leader, and team member. DHS appears to be taking a top-down approach by training its senior and executive members first.<sup>188</sup> The reason for this situation, as stated by the LDP managers, is “the office prioritized implementation of the supervisor tier at the direction of the then deputy secretary, who identified supervisors as a critical nexus between strategic leadership and employee performance.”<sup>189</sup> While this opinion may be true, the numbers from OPM surveys suggest that junior personnel need to be trained first, or at the same time, as executive and managers. Such a bottom-up approach may help junior personnel understand what senior leadership is trying to achieve, as well as let them know that their jobs as team leaders and team members are not undervalued. This measure may increase employee’s perception of the organization, which should increase the overall view of leadership within the organization.<sup>190</sup>

## **3. Understand/Manage Duplication**

Allowing its component agencies to conduct leadership training at the organizational level is setting DHS up for future problems regarding training duplication. As DHS develops standardized training material, there will be a transition period during which individuals may find themselves taking department-wide training that resembles training provided by their unit. This overlap is not bad, unless the transition period last too long. Duplication could mean twice the labor hours and twice the cost. Feedback on this issue was provided by DHS Fleet Law Enforcement Training Center when it expressed that it already had programs in place that were similar to programs DHS was considering implementing organization wide.<sup>191</sup> DHS must do a cost benefit analysis

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<sup>188</sup> Ibid., 24.

<sup>189</sup> Ibid., 25.

<sup>190</sup> See Appendix E for examples of LDP’s for selected DHS departments.

<sup>191</sup> Government Accountability Office, *DHS Training*, 28.

comparing training at the organizational level and training at the component level to determine the best method of delivery. In this connection, DHS should evaluate DOD leadership training distribution, effectiveness, and cost.

While specific procedural training is not the type of training DHS wants to teach on a large scale, due to differences in component operations, leadership is a topic that can be discussed to components in a standardized manner. Officials from organizations, such as TSA and the Coast Guard, expressed their desire for both unit specific training and LDP organizational training because the two combined form the best overall method leadership training.<sup>192</sup> However, flaws in department-wide leadership training have been identified. Not all supervisors and managers do the same thing. Some examples include supervisor involvement with contractors, hiring new employees, and various procedural activities that do not exist in certain organizations.

Department-wide training is never perfect for everyone, and it is up to DHS to provide individual supervisors the latitude to determine what is useful to them and what is not. Both departmental and component personnel who are advocating for better leadership training must recognize that at some point there will be overlap during which department-wide training will not address the nuances of component specific leadership traits, characteristics, and expectations; however, it does in fact identify and train to leadership characteristics and methodologies that are helpful to all employees working for DHS.

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<sup>192</sup> Ibid., 31.

## APPENDIX A. EMPLOYEE PARTICIPATION PER YEAR IN SURVEYS

Table 9. The Percent of Personnel from DHS Who Participated per Year in Employee Surveys<sup>193</sup>

Year	Percent
2004	51.3
2006	55.5
2008	49.8
2010	49.6
2011	51.8
2012	46.5
2013	47.7
2014	45.8
2015	47.1

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<sup>193</sup> Adapted from Office of Personnel Management, “Data Analysis and Documentation: Employee Surveys,” accessed August 14, 2016, <http://www.fedview.opm.gov/>.

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## APPENDIX B. LEADERSHIP QUESTIONS OPM SURVEY

Table 10. OPM Survey: Leadership Questions<sup>194</sup>

<b>(53) In my organization, leaders generate high levels of motivation and commitment in the workforce.</b>						
<b>Strongly Agree</b>	<b>Agree</b>	<b>Neither Agree nor Disagree</b>	<b>Disagree</b>	<b>Strongly Disagree</b>	<b>Total # of Respondents (excludes Do Not Know)</b>	<b># of Do Not Know</b>
11.5%	29.3%	24.1%	19.4%	15.7%	401,121	7,849
<b>(54) My organization's leaders maintain high standards of honesty and integrity.</b>						
<b>Strongly Agree</b>	<b>Agree</b>	<b>Neither Agree nor Disagree</b>	<b>Disagree</b>	<b>Strongly Disagree</b>	<b>Total # of Respondents (excludes Do Not Know)</b>	<b># of Do Not Know</b>
17.2%	35.1%	24.1%	11.1%	12.5%	383,737	24,649
<b>(55) Supervisors work well with employees of different backgrounds.</b>						
<b>Strongly Agree</b>	<b>Agree</b>	<b>Neither Agree nor Disagree</b>	<b>Disagree</b>	<b>Strongly Disagree</b>	<b>Total # of Respondents (excludes Do Not Know)</b>	<b># of Do Not Know</b>
19.2%	45.1%	21.9%	7.0%	6.7%	379,628	25,756
<b>(56) Managers communicate the goals and priorities of the organization.</b>						
<b>Strongly Agree</b>	<b>Agree</b>	<b>Neither Agree nor Disagree</b>	<b>Disagree</b>	<b>Strongly Disagree</b>	<b>Total # of Respondents (excludes Do Not Know)</b>	<b># of Do Not Know</b>
16.2%	45.2%	19.6%	10.9%	8.2%	401,551	5,334
<b>(57) Managers review and evaluate the organization's progress toward meeting its goals and objectives.</b>						
<b>Strongly Agree</b>	<b>Agree</b>	<b>Neither Agree nor Disagree</b>	<b>Disagree</b>	<b>Strongly Disagree</b>	<b>Total # of Respondents (excludes Do Not Know)</b>	<b># of Do Not Know</b>
16.5%	44.6%	23.1%	8.8%	7.0%	379,267	27,154

<sup>194</sup> Adapted from 2014 OPM Federal Viewpoint Survey

**(58) Managers promote communication among different work units (for example, about projects, goals, needed resources).**

<b>Strongly Agree</b>	<b>Agree</b>	<b>Neither Agree nor Disagree</b>	<b>Disagree</b>	<b>Strongly Disagree</b>	<b>Total # of Respondents (excludes Do Not Know)</b>	<b># of Do Not Know</b>
14.6%	37.9%	22.1%	14.4%	10.9%	393,192	14,282

**(59) Managers support collaboration across work units to accomplish work objectives.**

<b>Strongly Agree</b>	<b>Agree</b>	<b>Neither Agree nor Disagree</b>	<b>Disagree</b>	<b>Strongly Disagree</b>	<b>Total # of Respondents (excludes Do Not Know)</b>	<b># of Do Not Know</b>
16.0%	40.4%	22.0%	11.9%	9.7%	392,340	14,928

**(60) Overall, how good a job do you feel is being done by the manager directly above your immediate supervisor?**

<b>Very Good</b>	<b>Good</b>	<b>Fair</b>	<b>Poor</b>	<b>Very Poor</b>	<b>Total # of Respondents (excludes Do Not Know)</b>	<b># of Do Not Know</b>
25.0%	34.3%	22.7%	9.3%	8.7%	384,360	23,479

**(61) I have a high level of respect for my organization's senior leaders.**

<b>Strongly Agree</b>	<b>Agree</b>	<b>Neither Agree nor Disagree</b>	<b>Disagree</b>	<b>Strongly Disagree</b>	<b>Total # of Respondents (excludes Do Not Know)</b>	<b># of Do Not Know</b>
20.0%	32.6%	23.8%	12.8%	10.8%	402,356	5,387

**(62) Senior leaders demonstrate support for Work/Life programs.**

<b>Strongly Agree</b>	<b>Agree</b>	<b>Neither Agree nor Disagree</b>	<b>Disagree</b>	<b>Strongly Disagree</b>	<b>Total # of Respondents (excludes Do Not Know)</b>	<b># of Do Not Know</b>
20.8%	36.9%	25.0%	9.3%	8.0%	371,258	36,507

## APPENDIX C. VARIATION OF RESPONSES FROM 2012–2014

Table 11. Trend Analysis 2012–2014<sup>195</sup>


Percentages	Strongly Agree			Agree			Neither Agree Nor Disagree			Disagree			Strongly Disagree		
Question #	2014/2013/2012			2014/2013/2012			2014/2013/2012			2014/2013/2012			2014/2013/2012		
53	6.4	6.5	7.5	19.6	23.4	25.4	20.2	23.4	25.4	23.4	24.7	23.9	30.5	22.0	19.3
54	11.1	12.3	13.5	28.0	32.3	33.4	23.5	22.6	23.3	14.1	15.1	14.2	23.3	17.7	15.6
55	13.2	13.1	13.9	43.1	41.3	41.9	24.2	24.7	23.7	9.1	10.5	10.3	10.3	10.4	10.2
56	9.4	10.6	11.8	36.6	39.9	41.4	21.3	21.4	20.9	16.2	14.7	14.1	16.5	13.4	11.8
57	9.4	10.2	11.4	34.5	37.2	38.8	27.1	27.1	26.7	13.7	13.5	12.7	15.2	12.0	10.8
58	8.3	9.0	10.0	28.6	30.8	32.4	23.1	24.0	23.7	19.2	19.2	18.2	20.8	17.0	15.7
59	9.1	9.7	10.8	31.4	34.4	35.3	24.5	24.7	24.4	16.5	16.1	15.5	18.5	15.1	14.1
60	16.5	16.9	18.3	28.8	30.1	30.8	25.6	26.5	25.9	13.8	13.4	12.8	15.3	13.1	12.2
61	13.2	14.5	16.6	25.2	27.3	29.6	24.1	23.5	23.5	17.3	16.5	14.9	20.1	18.1	15.4
62	11.7	12.6	13.5	27.1	28.8	29.5	28.6	28.5	28.6	15.2	14.5	14.3	17.5	15.7	14.2

<sup>195</sup> Source: Office of Personnel Management, “Trend Analysis: 2011 vs. 2012 vs. 2013 Results,” accessed September 6, 2016, <https://www.fedview.opm.gov/2013/Reports/FHCSComp.asp?AGY=ALL>.

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## APPENDIX D. LEADER DEVELOPMENT FRAMEWORK

Figure 6. Leader Development Framework<sup>196</sup>



<sup>196</sup> Source: Government Accountability Office, *DHS Training*, 27.

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## APPENDIX E. EXAMPLES OF LEADERSHIP DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS

Figure 7. Examples of Leadership Development Programs<sup>197</sup>

Table 6: Examples of Leader Development Programs Delivered by Selected Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Components Independent of Department-wide Programming, Fiscal Years 2012-2013			
Component	Program name	Description	Intended participant
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)	Second Level Command Preparation	Six weeks of remote and classroom-based instruction followed by mentoring and project-based learning focused on leadership challenges faced by new CBP managers. This program stresses leadership, ethical decision making, and strategic thinking skills.	Manager
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)	Advanced Supervisor Leadership Training	One week of instruction focusing on a supervisor's ability to motivate employees, match strengths and talents to performance, and create an ICE culture of learning. <sup>a</sup>	Manager
Federal Law Enforcement Training Center	Situational Leadership II for Law Enforcement Training Program	Three days of classroom-based instruction intended to provide participants with leadership tools to enhance their effectiveness and success as supervisors. This program teaches participants a specific leadership model to use to develop their subordinates.	Supervisor or manager
U.S. Coast Guard	Executive Change Leadership Program	One-week course for newly selected executives that focuses on issues of personal change management and leading organizational change and performance.	Executive
Transportation Security Administration	Mid-Level Development Program	Over a period of 18 to 24 months, this program aims to prepare participants for critical leadership positions through training, shadowing, mentoring, and other developmental leadership opportunities. The program's focus is to build adequate future leadership capable of replacing leaders who retire or leave and retain experienced personnel with strong, demonstrated leadership skills.	Supervisor

Source: GAO analysis of DHS information. | GAO-14-688

<sup>197</sup> Source: Government Accountability Office, *DHS Training*, 18.

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